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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM 
BY SANFORD J. GROSSMAN AND OLIVER D. HART' 
Most  analyses  of  the  principal-agent problem  assume  that  the  principal chooses  an 
incentive  scheme  to  maximize expected  utility subject to  the  agent's utility being  at  a 
stationary point. An important paper of Mirrlees has shown that this approach is generally 
invalid.  We  present  an  alternative procedure.  If  the  agent's  preferences  over  income 
lotteries are independent of  action,  we  show  that the  optimal way  of  implementing an 
action by the agent can be found by solving a convex programming problem. We use this 
to  characterize the  optimal  incentive  scheme  and  to  analyze  the  determinants of  the 
seriousness of an incentive problem. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
IT  HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED for some time that, in the presence of moral hazard, 
market allocations under uncertainty will not be unconstrained Pareto optimal 
(see Arrow [1], Pauly [13]). It is only relatively recently, however, that economists 
have begun to undertake a systematic analysis of  the properties of  the second- 
best allocations which will arise under these conditions. Much of this analysis has 
been  concerned with what has become  known as the principal-agent problem. 
Consider  two  individuals  who  operate  in  an  uncertain  environment  and  for 
whom risk sharing is desirable. Suppose that one of the individuals (known as the 
agent) is to take an action which the other individual (known as the principal) 
cannot observe. Assume that this action affects the total amount of consumption 
or  money  which  is  available  to  be  divided  between  the  two  individuals.  In 
general, the action which is optimal for the agent will depend on the extent of 
risk sharing between the principal and the agent. The question is: What is the 
optimal degree of risk sharing, given this dependence? 
Particular applications of the principal-agent problem have been made to the 
case of an insurer who cannot observe the level of care taken by the person being 
insured; to the case of  a landlord who cannot observe the input decision  of  a 
tenant farmer (sharecropping); and to the case of an owner of a firm who cannot 
observe the effort level of a manager or worker.2 
Although considerable progress has been made in the recent literature towards 
understanding and solving the principal-agent problem (see, in particular, Harris 
and Raviv [6], Holmstrom [7], Mirrlees [10, 11, 12], Shavell [19, 20], as well as the 
other  references in  footnote  2),  the  mathematical  approach  which  has  been 
adopted  in  most  of  this  literature is  unsatisfactory.  The  procedure  usually 
followed  is to  suppose that the principal chooses  the risk-sharing contract, or 
incentive scheme, to maximize his expected utility subject to the constraints that 
'Support  from the U.K.  Social Science Research Council and NSF  Grant No.  SOC70-13429 is 
gratefully  acknowledged.  We  would  like  to  thank  Bengt  Holmstrom,  Mark  Machina,  Andreu 
Mas-Colell, and Jim Mirrlees for helpful comments. 
2These and other applications are discussed in a number of recent papers. See, for example, Harris 
and Raviv [6], Holmstrom [7], Mirrlees [10, 11, 12], Radner [15], Ross [17], Rubinstein and Yaari [18], 
Shavell [19, 20], Spence and Zeckhauser [21], Stiglitz [22], and Zeckhauser [24]. 









I  I 
For a given  I the  agent  strictly  prefers  lower  actions 
FIGURE  1. 
(a) the agent's expected utility is no lower than some pre-specified level; (b) the 
agent's  utility  is  at  a  stationary point,  i.e.,  the  agent  satisfies  his  first-order 
conditions with respect to the choice of action. That is, the agent's second-order 
conditions (and the condition that the agent should be at a global rather than a 
local maximum) are ignored. Mirrlees [10], however, in an important paper, has 
shown  that  this  procedure  is  generally  invalid  unless,  at  the  optimum,  the 
solution to the agent's maximum problem is unique. In the absence of uniqueness 
(and it is difficult to guarantee uniqueness in advance), the first-order conditions 
derived  by  the  above  procedure  are  not  even  necessary  conditions  for  the 
optimality of the risk-sharing contract.3 
3The reason for this can be seen quite easily in Figure 1 (we are grateful to Andreu Mas-Colell for 
suggesting the use of this figure). On the horizontal axis, I represents the agent's incentive scheme and 
on the vertical axis a represents the agent's action. The curve ABCDE is the locus of pairs of actions 
and incentive schemes which satisfy the agent's first order conditions, i.e., given I the agent's utility is 
at a stationary point. Of these points, only those lying  on the segments AB and DE  represent global 
maxima for the agent, e.g. given the incentive scheme I the agent's optimal action is at P',  not at P2 
or p3. Indifference curves-in  terms of a and I-are  drawn for the principal (C is on a higher curve 
than B). The true feasible set for the principal are the segments AB and DE and the optimal outcome 
for the principal is therefore B. However, B does not satisfy the first order conditions of the problem: 
maximize the principal's utility subject to (a, I)  lying on ABCDE,  i.e., subject to (a, I)  satisfying the 
agent's first order conditions (the solution to this problem is at C). In other words, B does not satisfy 
the  necessary conditions  for  optimality  of  the  problem  which  has  been  studied  in  much  of  the 
literature. Note  finally that perturbing Figure 1 slightly does not alter this conclusion. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  9 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a method for analyzing the principal- 
agent  problem which  avoids  the difficulties  of  the  "first-order condition"  ap- 
proach.4 Our approach is to break the principal's problem up into a computation 
of  the costs and benefits of  the different actions taken by  the agent. For each 
action, we consider the incentive scheme which minimizes the (expected) cost of 
getting the agent to choose that action. We show that, under the assumption that 
the agent's preferences over income  lotteries are independent of  the action  he 
takes, this cost minimization problem is a fairly straightforward  convex program- 
ming problem. An analysis of these convex problems as the agent's action varies 
yields a number of results about the form of the optimal incentive scheme. We 
will  also  be  able  to  analyze  what  factors determine how  serious a  particular 
incentive problem is; i.e., how great the loss is to the principal from having to 
operate in a second-best situation where the agent's action cannot be observed 
relative to a first-best situation where it can be observed. 
The assumption that the agent's preferences over income lotteries are indepen- 
dent of action is a strong one. Yet it seems a natural starting point for an analysis 
of the principal-agent problem. Special cases of this assumption occur when the 
agent's utility function is additively or multiplicatively separable in action and 
reward. One or other of these cases is typically assumed in most of the literature. 
In Section 6 we discuss briefly the prospects for the non-independence case. 
In addition to providing greater rigor, the costs versus benefits approach also 
provides a clear separation of the two distinct roles the agent's output plays in 
the principal-agent problem. On  the one  hand,  the agent's output  contributes 
positively to the principal's consumption, so the principal desires a high output. 
On  the  other hand,  the  agent's output  is  a  signal  to  the principal about  the 
agent's  level  of  effort.  This  informational  role  may  be  in  conflict  with  the 
consumption role. For example, there may be a moderate output level which is 
achieved when the agent takes low effort levels and never occurs at other effort 
levels. If the agent is penalized whenever this moderate output occurs, then he is 
discouraged from taking these low effort actions. However, there may be lower 
output  levels  which  have  some  chance  of  occurring regardless of  the  agent's 
action. To encourage the agent to take high effort levels, it is then optimal to pay 
the agent more in low output states than in moderate output states, even though 
the principal prefers moderate output levels to low output levels. 
The dual role of  output makes it difficult to obtain conditions which ensure 
even  elementary properties of  the incentive  scheme,  such  as  monotonicity.  In 
Section 3, sufficient conditions for monotonicity are given. It is also shown in this 
section that a monotone likelihood ratio condition, which the "first-order condi- 
tion" approach suggests is a guarantee of  monotonicity,  must be  strengthened 
once we take into account the possibility that the agent's action is not unique at 
the optimal incentive scheme. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show how the principal's 
optimization problem can be decomposed into a costs versus benefits problem. 
4Mirrlees  [12] has identified a class of cases where the "first-order condition" approach is valid. 
We will consider this class in Section 3. 10  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
In Section 3, we use our approach to analyze the monotonicity and progressivity 
of  the optimal incentive scheme.  In Section 4,  we  give a simple algorithm for 
computing  an  optimal  incentive  scheme  when  there  are  only  two  outcomes 
associated with the agent's actions. In Section 5, we analyze the effects of risk 
aversion and information quality on the incentive problem. Finally, in Section 6 
we consider some extensions of the analysis. 
2.  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The application of the principal-agent problem that we will consider is to the 
case of the owner of a firm who delegates the running of the firm to a manager. 
The owner is the principal and the manager the agent. The owner is assumed not 
to be able to monitor the manager's actions. The owner does, however, observe 
the outcome  of  these actions, which we will take to be  the firm's profit. It is 
assumed that the firm's profit depends  on  the manager's actions,  but  also  on 
other factors which  are outside  the  manager's control-we  model  these  as  a 
random component. Thus, in particular, if the firm does well, it will not generally 
be clear to the owner whether this is because the manager has worked well or 
whether it is because he has been lucky.5 
We will simplify matters by assuming that there are only finitely many possible 
gross profit levels for the firm, denoted ql,  .  . . ,  qn, where q1 <  q2 <  .  .  .  <  qn. 
We will assume that the principal is interested only in the firm's net profit, i.e. 
gross profit minus the payment to the manager. We will also assume that the 
principal is risk neutral-our  methods of analysis can, however, be applied to the 
case where the principal is risk averse (see Remark 3 and Section 6). 
Let A be the set of actions available to the manager. We will assume that A is 
a  non-empty,  compact  subset  of  a  finite  dimensional  Euclidean  space.  Let 
S =  {  x E R  I  x >  0, En=1  7Xi  =  1  }.  We assume that there is a continuous function 
7T: A -*  S,  where 7T(a) =  (wj(a),  ...  ,  wn(a)) gives the probabilities of  the n out- 
comes  ql,  .  .  . ,  qn if  action  a  is  selected.  It  is  assumed  that,  when  the  agent 
chooses a E A, he knows the probability function 7T  but not the outcome which 
will  result from  his  action.  We  assume  that  the  agent  has  a  von  Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility function U(a, I)  which depends both on his action a and his 
remuneration I  from the principal. We  include  a  as an  argument in  order to 
capture the idea that the agent dislikes working hard, taking care, etc. 
The crucial assumption that we will make about the form of  U(a, I)  is: 
ASSUMPTION A1:  U(a, I)  can be written as G(a) +  K(a) V(I),  where (1) V is a 
real-valued, continuous,  strictly increasing, concave  function  defined  on  some 
open  interval I  =  (I, o)  of  the real line;  (2)  limI,,  V(I)  =  -  ox;  (3)  G, K  are 
5The  assumption that the principal cannot monitor the agent's actions at all may in some cases be 
rather extreme.  For  a  discussion  of  the  implications  of  the  existence  of  imperfect  monitoring 
opportunities, see Harris and Raviv [6], Holmstrom [7] and Shavell [19, 20]. See also Remark 4 in 
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real-valued, continuous functions defined on A and K is strictly positive; (4) for 
all a,, a2 E A  and  I  _ 
E,  G(a,) + K(a1) V(I)  ?  G(a2)+  K(a2)V(I) => G(a)  + 
K(al) V(I) 2  G(a2) +  K(a2) V(I). 
In the above, we allow for the case I =-  . 
The main part of Assumption Al  has a simple ordinal interpretation. Assump- 
tion Al  implies that the agent's preferences over income lotteries are independent 
of his action (Assumption Al(1)  tells us also that these preferences exhibit risk 
aversion). The converse can also be shown to be true: if the agent's preferences 
over income  lotteries are independent of  a,  then  U can  be  written as  G(a) + 
K(a) V(I)  for some  functions  G, K, V (for a proof,  see  Keeney  [8]). Note  that 
Assumption Al  does not imply that the agent's preferences for action  lotteries are 
independent of  income.  We will insist, however, that the agent's ranking over 
perfectly  certain  actions  is  independent  of  income-this  is  condition  (4)  of 
Assumption Al. 
Note  that if K(a)  is not  constant then (2) and (4) imply that  V(I)  must be 
bounded from above. Further if it is also the case that G(a)  0, then V(I)  must 
be non-positive everywhere. 
Two  special cases  of  Assumption  Al  occur when  K(a)=  constant,  i.e.  U is 
additively separable in a  and I,  and when  G(a) =  0,  i.e.  U is multiplicatively 
separable in a and I.  In these cases the agent's preferences over action lotteries 
are  independent of  income,  as well as preferences over income  lotteries being 
independent of action.6 
An  interesting  special  case  of  multiplicative  separability  is  when  V(I)= 
-e-  k,  K(a)  =  eka  and  A  is  a  subset  of  the  real  line.  Then  U(a,I)  = 
-e-  k(-a);  i.e., effort appears just as negative income. 
In the "first-best" situation where the principal can observe a, it is optimal for 
him to pay the agent according to the action he chooses. Let  U be the agent's 
reservation price, i.e.  the  expected  level  of  utility he  can  achieve  by  working 
elsewhere, and  let  Qt =  V(J) =  {v  v =  V(I)  for  some  I  E  }.  We  make  the 
following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION  A2:  [ U-  G(a)]/K(a)  E Q?t  for all a E A. 
DEFINITION:  Let  CFB  A -> R  be  defined  by  CFB(a) =  h([ U -G(a)]/K(a)), 
where h _  V-  1. 
Here  CFB stands for first-best cost.  CFB(a)  is  simply the agent's reservation 
price  for  picking  action  a.  To  get  the  agent  to  pick  a E A  in  the  first-best 
6The converse is also true: if preferences over action lotteries are independent of income as well as 
preferences over income lotteries being independent of action, then U is additively or multiplicatively 
separable (see Keeney [8] or Pollak [14]). 12  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
situation,  the  principal will  offer  him  the  following  contract:  I  will  pay  you 
CFB(a) if you choose a and I otherwise, where I is very close to I. 
DEFINITION:  Let  B: A -  R  be  defined  by  B(a) =  I7T1(a)q1. B(a)  is  the 
expected benefit to the principal from getting the agent to pick a. 
DEFINITION:  A  first-best  optimal  action  is  one  which  maximizes  B(a)  - 
CFB(a) on A. 
The  function  CFB induces  a  complete  ordering on A:  a  a'  if  and  only  if 
CFB(a) ? CFB(a').  For  obvious  reasons  we  will  refer  to  actions  with  higher 
CFB(a)'s as costlier actions. It is easy to show, in view of Assumption A1(4), that 
CFB(a) ?  CFB(a')  =- G(a) +  K(a)v  <  G(a') +  K(a')v  for  all  v E Qt1  G(a) + 
K(a)v  <  G(a') +  K(a')v  for some v E Qt. This in turn implies that the ordering 
>  is independent of  U. In the second-best situation where a is not observed by 
the principal, it is not possible to make the agent's remuneration depend on a. 
Instead, the principal will pay the agent according to the outcome of his action, 
i.e.  according  to  the  firm's  profit.  An  incentive  scheme  is  therefore  an  n- 
dimensional vector I = (II  ,  I2'  ...  .  In)  &  In,  where Ii is the agent's remuneration 
in the event that the firm's profit is q*. Given the incentive scheme I,  the agent 
will choose a E A to maximize  En=  17Tj(a) U(a, Ii). 
We will assume that the principal knows the agent's utility function  U(a, I), 
the  set A  and  the  function  7 :A -S.  In  other  words,  the  principal  is  fully 
informed  about  the  agent  and  about  the  firm's production  possibilities.  The 
incentive  problem  which  we  will  study  therefore arises  entirely  because  the 
principal cannot monitor the agent's actions.7 
The principal's problem can be described as follows. Let F be the set of pairs 
of  incentive schemes I*  and actions a*  such that, under I*,  the agent will be 
willing  to  work for  the  principal  and  will  find  it  optimal  to  choose  a*,  i.e. 
maxa  EAn  Ii  (a)  U(a,IP)  =  En= 17j(a*)U(a*,PI*)>  U.  Then  the  principal 
chooses (I, a) E F to maximize En=  I7Ti(a)(qi  -  I).  It simplifies matter considera- 
bly if we break this problem up into two parts. We consider first, given that the 
principal wishes to implement a*, the least cost way of achieving this. We then 
consider  which  a*  should  be  implemented.  Thus,  to  begin,  suppose  that  the 
principal wishes the agent to pick a particular action a* E A.  To find the least 
(expected)  cost  way  of  achieving  this,  the  principal must  solve  the  following 
7This distinguishes our study from the literature on incentive compatibility; see, e.g., the recent 
Review of Economic Studies symposium [16]. The  incentive  compatibility  literature has  been  con- 
cerned with incentive problems arising from differences in information between individuals rather 
than with those arising from monitoring problems. In cases of differential information, there is a role 
for an exchange of information through messages, whereas in the model we study messages would 
serve no purpose. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  13 
problem: 
n 
(2.1)  Choose  II,  ...  , In to minimize  W  7(a*)Ii 
i =  1 
n 
subject to  W  71(a*) U(a*, Ii ) ?  U, 
i =  1 
n  n 
7  Ti(a*)  U(a*, Ii) ?  7Ti  (a) U(a, Ii)  for all  a E A, 
___  i=l1 
Ii EJ  for all i. 
This problem can be simplified considerably in view of Assumption Al.  It will 
be  convenient  to  regard vI  =  V(II),  .  .  .  ,  vn =  V(In) as  the  principal's control 
variables. Recall that Qt =  V(J) =  {  v  v =  V(I)  for some I  E f }. By Assumption 
Al,  Qt is  an  interval of  the real line  (-oo,).  Thus  we  may  rewrite (2.1)  as 
follows: 
n 
(2.2)  Choose v,  ...  ,  vn to minimize  W  7(a*)h(vi) 
subject to  G(a*)  +  K(a*)  7Ti(a*)1  2  G(a)  +  K(a)(  7Ti(a)vi) 
for all  a E A, 
G(a*)  +  kK=1  a()  )  (a) 
, 
vi et  foralli, 
where  h  V  1. 
The important point to realize is that the constraints in (2.2) are linear in the 
vj's. Furthermore, V concave implies h  convex, and so the objective function is 
convex in the vi's. Thus (2.2) is a rather simple optimization problem: minimize a 
convex function subject to (a possibly infinite number of) linear constraints. In 
particular, when A is a finite set, the Kuhn-Tucker  theorem yields necessary and 
sufficient conditions for optimality. These will be analyzed later. 
It  is  important to  realize that, in  the  absence  of  Assumption  Al,  it  is  not 
generally possible to convert (2.1) into a convex problem in this way. 
DEFINITION: If  I = (II,  ...  ,  In)  satisfies  the  constraints  in  (2.1)  or  v = 
(vl,  . ..  , vn) satisfies the constraints in (2.2), we will say that I  or v implements 
action a*.  (We are assuming here that if  the agent is indifferent between  two 
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Consider the  set of  v's  which implement a*.  For  some  a*,  this set may  be 
empty, in which case action a* cannot be implemented by the principal at any 
cost. If the set is non-empty, then, since h is convex, 
n  n  U  -  UG(a*) 
1  2  i(a*)vi)  2  h  K(a*) 
by (2.2), and so the principal's objective function is bounded below on this set. 
Let C(a*)  be the greatest lower bound of En.=17Ti(a*)h(vi)  on this set. 
DEFINITION:  Let  C(a*)  =  inf {  En=  17Ti (a *)h (vi) I  v =  (v  1, ...  ,  vn)  implements 
a*} if the constraint set in (2.2) is non-empty. In the case where the constraint set 
of  (2.2) is empty, write C(a*) =  ox.  This defines the second-best  cost  function 
C: A -*  Ru  { o. 
The above constitutes the first step(s) of the principal's optimization problem: 
for each a E A,  compute  C(a).  The  second  step is  to  choose  which  action  to 
implement, i.e. to choose a E A to maximize B(a)  -  C(a).  This second problem 
will not generally be a convex problem. This is because even if B (a) is concave in 
a,  C(a)  will  not  generally  be  convex.  Fortunately,  a  significant  amount  of 
information about the form of the optimal incentive scheme can be obtained by 
studying the first step alone. 
DEFINITION:  A second-best optimal action a  is one which maximizes B(a)  - 
C(a)  on A. A second-best optimal incentive scheme I  is one that implements a 
second-best  optimal  action  a  at least expected  cost, i.e. En=l7i(  =  c(a). 
Note  that for  a  second-best  optimal  incentive  scheme  to  exist,  the  greatest 
lower bound  in  the definition of  C(a)  must actually be  achieved.  In order to 
establish the existence of a second-best optimal action and a second-best optimal 
incentive scheme, we need a further assumption. 
ASSUMPTION  A3:  For  all a  E  A  and  i =  I,  ...  , n,  7Ti(a)  >  0. 
Since  there  are  only  finitely  many  possible  profit  levels,  Assumption  A3 
implies that 7Ti(a) is bounded away from zero. Hence Assumption A3 rules out 
cases studied by Mirrlees [12] in which an optimum can be approached but not 
achieved by imposing higher and higher penalties on the agent which occur with 
smaller and smaller probability if the agent chooses the right action. 
PROPOSITION  1: Assume A1-A3.  Then there exists a second-best optimal action 
a and a second-best optimal incentive  scheme I. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  15 
PROOF: It is helpful to split the proof up into two parts. Consider first the case 
where V is linear. Then it is easy to see that the principal can do as well in the 
second-best  as in  the first-best where the agent can  be  monitored.  For let a* 
maximize B(a)  -  CFB(a)  on A.  Let the principal offer the agent the incentive 
scheme Ii =  qi-  t, where t = B(a*)  -  CFB(a*).  Then the principal's  profit will 
be  B(a*)  -  CFB(a*)  whatever the  agent does.  On  the  other hand,  by  picking 
a =  a*,  the agent can obtain expected utility U. Hence  Proposition  1 certainly 
holds when V is linear. 
On  the  other  hand,  suppose  V  is  not  linear.  We  show  first,  that,  if  the 
constraint  set  is  nonempty  for  an  action  a* E A,  then  problem  (2.2)  has  a 
solution, i.e. Z7%1vj(a*)h(v1)  achieves its greatest lower bound C(a*). Note  that 
zi  =  ITi(a*)vi  is bounded below on the 6onstraint set of (2.2). It therefore follows 
from a result of  Bertsekas [2] that unbounded  sequences in  the constraint set 
make  Zn=7  1(a*)h(v1)  tend  to  infinity  (roughly  because  the  variance  of  the 
vj-oo  while their mean  is bounded  below,  and h  is convex  and  nonlinear- 
Assumption  A3  is important here). Hence,  we  can  artificially bound  the  con- 
straint  set.  Since  the  constraint  set  is  closed,  the  existence  of  a  minimum 
therefore follows from Weierstrass' theorem. 
We show next that C(a) is a lower semicontinuous function of a. If A is finite, 
then any function defined on A is continuous and hence lower semicontinuous. 
Assume  therefore that A  is  not  finite.  Let  (ar)  be  a  sequence  of  points  in A 
converging  to  a.  Assume  without  loss  of  generality (w.l.o.g.)  that  C(ar) -*  k. 
Then, if k =  ox,  we certainly have  C(a) <  limrO  C(ar). Suppose therefore that 
k <  ox. Let (I,  ...  , In,) be the solution to (2.1) when a* = ar. Then Bertsekas' 
result together with Assumption  A3  shows that the sequence  ((IK, . ..  , In)) is 
bounded  (otherwise  C(ar) -x  oo).  Let  (II,  . . . , In)  be  a  limit  point.  Then 
clearly  (II, . . . , In) implements  a  and  so  C(a) <  Eni=17  i(a)Ij =  limrO  C(ar). 
This proves lower semicontinuity. 
Given  that C(a)  is lower semicontinuous and A  is compact, it follows  from 
Weierstrass' theorem that maxa  EA[B(a)  -  C(a)]  has a solution, as long as C(a) 
is finite for some a E A. To prove this last part, we show that C(a*)  =  CFB(a*)  if 
a* minimizes CFB(a) on A. To see this, note that the a* which minimizes CFB(a) 
can be implemented by setting Ii =  CFB(a*)  for all i. 
We  have  thus established the  existence  of  a  second-best  optimal  action,  a, 
when V is nonlinear. Since we have also shown that (2.2) has a solution as long 
as  the  constraint  set  is  non-empty  and  V  is  nonlinear,  this  establishes  the 
existence of a second-best optimal incentive scheme.  Q.E.D. 
It is interesting to ask whether the constraint that the agent's expected utility 
be greater than or equal to U is binding at a second-best optimum. The answer is 
no  in general, i.e.  for incentive reasons it may pay  the principal to  choose  an 
incentive scheme which gives the agent an expected utility in excess of  U. One 
case where this will not happen is when the agent's utility function is additively 
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PROPOSITION 2:  Assume Al,  A2, and either K(a)  is a constant  function on A or 
G(a) = 0 for all a E A. Let a' be a second-best optimal action and I a second-best 
optimal incentive  scheme which implements  a.  Then  a  =r  a(I)  U(a,Ii)=  U. 
PROOF:  Suppose not.  Write v  =  V(I,).  Then  G(  ) +  K aa  vi>  U 
in  (2.2).  But it  is  clear that  the  principal's costs  can  be  reduced  and  all  the 
constraints of (2.2) will still be satisfied if we replace vi by (VI -  E) for all i in the 
additively  separable  case  and  by  vj(1 +  e)  for  all  i  in  the  multiplicatively 
separable case where e >  0  is small (note  that in the multiplicatively separable 
case, it follows from (2)-(4)  of Assumption Al  that V(I)  < 0  for all I  E  4, and 
so vI < 0).  In other words, a can be implemented at lower expected cost, which 
contradicts the fact that we are at a second-best optimum.  Q.E.D. 
REMARK 1: The proof of Proposition 1 establishes that C(a*)  =  CFB(a*)  if a* 
minimizes CFB(a)  on A. This is a reflection of the fact that there is no trade-off 
between  risk sharing and  incentives  when  the  action  to  be  implemented  is  a 
cost-minimizing one (i.e. involves the agent in minimum "effort"). 
REMARK  2:  In  general,  there  may  be  more  than  one  second-best  optimal 
action and more than one second-best optimal incentive scheme. It is clear from 
(2.2), however, that, if V is strictly concave, there is a unique second-best optimal 
incentive scheme which implements any particular second-best optimal action. 
DEFINITION:  Let L =  maxaEA(B(a)  -  CFB(a))-  SUpaEA(B(a)  -  C(a))  be the 
difference between the principal's expected profit in the first-best and  second- 
best situations. 
L represents the loss which the principal incurs as a result of being unable to 
observe the agent's action (we write sup(B(a)  -  C(a))  rather than max(B(a)  - 
C(a))  to  cover  cases  where  the  assumptions  of  Proposition  1 do  not  hold). 
Proposition 3 shows that, while there are some special cases in which L = 0, in 
general L > 0. 
PROPOSITION 3: Assume Al  and A2.  Then: (1)  C(a) >  CFB(a)  for  all  a E  A, 
which implies that L > 0. (2) If  V is linear, L = 0. (3) If  there exists a first-best 
optimal action a* E A satisfying:  for each i, 7Ti(a*) > O  X  7T,(a)  = O  for all a E A, 
a #  a*, then L = 0. (4) If A is a finite set and there is a first-best optimal action a* 
which satisfies: for  some i, 7Tj(a*)  =  0 and 7Tj(a) > 0 for  all a E A,  a #  a*,  then 
L = 0. (5) If there is a first-best optimal action a* E A which minimizes CFB (a) on 
A, L = 0. (6) If Assumption  A3 holds, every maximizer a of B(a)  -  CFB(a)  on A 
satisfies  CFB (a)  > mina EA CFB (a),  and V is strictly concave, then L > 0. 
PROOF: (1)  is  obvious  since  anything  which  is  second-best  feasible  is  also 
first-best feasible. (2) follows from the first part of the proof of Proposition 1. (5) 
follows from the proof of Proposition 1 (see also Remark 1). (3) and (4) follow 
from the fact that a* can be implemented by offering the agent Ii =  CFB (a*)  for 
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To prove (6), note that, if V is strictly concave, 
n 




C(a*)  =  7Ti(a*)h(V(Ii)) 
i=l1 
> h  (  7Ti(a*)  V(Ii))  2  h ((_  U-G(a*))/K(a*)) 
CFB  (a*) 
unless  Ii = constant  with  probability  1.  But,  since  7i(a*)  > 0  for  all  i,  Ii = 
constant with probability  1  => Ii is independent of  i. However, in this case, the 
constraints of problem (2.2) imply that CFB (a) is minimized at a*.  Q.E.D. 
Most of Proposition 3 is well known. Proposition 3(2) and (6) can be under- 
stood as follows. In the first-best situation, if the agent is strictly risk averse, the 
principal bears all the risk and the agent bears none. In the second best situation, 
this is generally undesirable. For if the agent is completely protected from risk, 
then he has no  incentive to work hard; i.e., he will choose  a E A  to minimize 
CFB(a).  Hence the second-best situation is strictly worse from a welfare point of 
view than the first-best situation. The exception is when the agent is risk neutral, 
in which case it is optimal both from a risk sharing and an incentive point of 
view for him to bear all the risk, or when the first-best optimal action is cost 
minimizing. 
In  the  case  of  Proposition  3(3)  and  3(4),  a  scheme  in  which  the  agent  is 
penalized very heavily if certain outcomes occur can be used to achieve the first 
best. This relates to results obtained in Mirrlees [12]. 
REMARK 3:  We have assumed that the principal is risk neutral. Our analysis 
generalizes to the case where the principal is risk averse, however. In this case, 
instead of choosing v to minimize Z7Ti(a*)h(v1)  in problem (2.2), we choose v to 
maximize  E7Ti(a*)  Up  (q  -  h(vi)),  where  Up is  the  principal's utility  function. 
Note  that (2.2) is still a  convex  problem. Although  we  can  no  longer analyze 
costs  and  benefits  separately, we  can,  for  each  a* E A,  define  a  net  benefit 
function maxv2vZi(a*)  Up  (q  -  h(vi)). An optimal action for the principal is now 
one that maximizes net benefits. See also Section 6 on this. 
REMARK 4:  We have taken the outcomes observed by the principal to be profit 
levels.  Our analysis generalizes, however, to  the  case  where the  outcomes  are 
more complicated objects, such as vectors of  profits, sales, etc., or to  the case 
where profits are not  observed at all but  something else is  (see,  e.g.,  Mirrlees 
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minimization problem (2.1) or (2.2). Thus, if the principal observes the realiza- 
tions of a signal 0, then Ii refers to the payment to the agent when 0  i  .  Let 
C(a, 0) be the cost of implementing a when the information structure is 0 (e.g. if 
0  reveals a exactly, then C(a, 0) =  CFB(a)).  Note that if the distribution of output 
is generated by a production function f(a, w),  such that the marginal distribu- 
tion  of  w  is  independent  of  the  information  structure, then  B (a) = Ef(a, w-) 
=  E [E [f(a, w-)  I  01]] is  independent  of  the  information  structure, given  a.  It 
follows that the effect of changes in the information structure is summarized by 
the way that C(a, 0) changes when the information structure changes. As will be 
seen in Section 5, this is quite easy to analyze. 
3.  SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF OPTIMAL INCENTIVE  'CHEMES 
It is of  interest to know whether the optimal incentive scheme is monotone 
increasing (i.e., whether the agent is paid more when a higher output is observed) 
and whether the scheme is progressive (i.e., whether the marginal benefit to the 
agent  of  increased output  is  decreasing in  output).  These  questions  are quite 
difficult to answer because of the informational role of output. As we noted in 
the introduction, the agent may be given a low income at intermediate levels of 
output in order to discourage particular effort levels. Nevertheless, some general 
results about the shape of optimal schemes can be established. We begin with the 
following lemma. 
LEMMA 1: Assume A1-A3.  Let (I)'=1, (Ii')= I be incentive  schemes which cause 
a  and  a'  to  be  optimal choices for  the  agent,  respectively, and  minimize the 
respective  costs (i.e.  (2.1) or (2.2) is solved). Let vi =  V(I)  and vi'  =  V(Ii'). Then, 
if  G(a) +  K(a)(En=  1I1i(a)vi)  =  G(a') + K(a')(  i= I  7T"(a')vt'),  i.e.  the agent's  ex- 
pected utility is the same under both schemes, we must have 
(3.1)  [7Tj (a)  )-  gi(a) ] (i' -vi)  > O. 
PROOF:  From (2.2) and the assumption that the agent's expected utility is the 
same, we have 
G(a') + K(a')(  7i(a')vi)  <  G(a)  + K(a)(  q rTi(a)  v) 
=  G(a')  +  K(a  )  Ti(a  vi 
G(a)  + K(a)(  7i(a)vi')  <  G(a')  + K(a')(  2rTi(a')v') 
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It follows from the first of these that  I  qrTi(a')(v'  -  vi) >  0 and from the second 
that  I  gi=r(a)(vi  -  v') > 0 (since K(a)  > 0 by Assumption A1(3)). Adding yields 
(3.1).  Q.E.D. 
We now use Lemma 1 to show that an optimal incentive scheme will have the 
property that the principal's and agent's returns are positive related over some 
range of  output levels;  i.e., it  is not  optimal to  have,  for all output levels  q*, 
qj: I, >  Ij  X  -  I, <  qj-  I.  The proof proceeds by showing that, if the princi- 
pal's and agent's payments are negatively related, then a twist in the incentive 
schedule which raises the agent's payment in high return states for the principal 
and lowers it in low return states for the principal can make the principal better 
off. The reason is that such a twist will be good  for incentives since it gets the 
agent  to  put  more  probability weight  on  states yielding  the  principal  a  high 
return, and it is also good for risk-sharing since it raises the agent's return in low 
return states for the agent and lowers the agent's return in high return states for 
the agent. Since the incentive and risk-sharing effects reinforce each other, the 
principal is made better off. 
In order to bring about both the incentive and risk-sharing effects, the twist in 
the incentive scheme must be chosen carefully. It is for this reason that the proof 
of the next proposition may seem rather complicated at first sight. 
PROPOSITION 4:  Assume A1-A3  and V strictly concave. Let (II,...  ,  In) be a 
second-best optimal incentive scheme. Then the following cannot be  true: Ii >  Ij 
q-  I<  qj-  Ifor  all  1 <i,j<  n and for some i,j,  I,>I.  and q, -  I,<  q1- 
Ii  I . 
PROOF:  Suppose that 
(3.2)  I, >  Ij  X  q-I,  <  q1  -Ij 
for all 1<  i ,<  n and for some i,j,  I, > Ij and q*  -  I, <  qj-  Ij. 
Let (I',  .  .  .,  In) be a new incentive scheme satisfying 
(3.3)  v'+Xh(vv')=v1+Xq1-  i  foralli 
where vi =  V(I),  vi'  =  V(Ii'), X > 0, and ti is such that 
(3.4)  Xmax(q1  -  h(vi)) >  ?  > Xmin(q1  -  h(vi)). 
1  1 
If X =  y  = 0,  then vi'  = vi solves (3.3). The implicit function  theorem therefore 
implies  that  (3.3)  has  a  solution  as  long  as  X, y  are small.  (Even  if  h  is  not 
differentiable it has left and right hand derivatives.) 
It follows from (3.2) and (3.4) that the change to the new incentive scheme has 
the effect of increasing the lowest Ii's and decreasing the highest ones. For each X 
pick  ti  so  that  G(a') +  K(a')(  I7.  T1(a')v1') =  lfaxaesA[G(a)  +  K(a)(En=  ITi (a) 
vi')]  = maxaEA[G(a)  +  K(a)(En=.  Ig(a)v1)]. This ensures that the agent's expected 20  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
utility remains the same. We  now  show  that the principal's expected  profit is 
higher under the new incentive scheme than under the old, which contradicts the 
optimality of (II,  *  .  ,  IJ) 
Substituting (3.1) of Lemma 1 into (3.3) yields: 
i  i(a')(qi  -h  (v'))  >  i  T1(a)(qi-h  (v-)) 
If we can show that E wi(a)h(v1')  < Z7Ti(a)h(vj), it will follow that 
i (a')(qi  -  h(v'))  >E  7Ti(a)(qi  -  h(v1)), 
i.e., the principal is better off. 
To see that E wi(a)h(v1')  < Ewi(a)h(vi),  note that 
7T1i(a)(h  (vi) -  h (v'))  > E  7Ti(a)h'(v')(vi  -  v) 
by the convexity of h (here h' is the right-hand derivative if h is not differentia- 
ble). It suffices therefore to show that the latter expression is positive. By (3.3), 
ETi (a) h'(vi')V-  vi')  =  v  7Ti(a)h  (vi)(h(vi)-Xq  +  I 
Suppose that this is nonpositive for small X. Divide by X and let X  ->  0. Assuming 
without loss of generality ti/X  converges to i  (we allow i  infinite) and that h'(v') 
converges to h', and using the fact that v' -  vi, we get 
(3.5)  7Ti (a)h1'(h(vi) -  q1  +  i)  <  0. 
However, from the fact that h'(v') is nondecreasing in vi' and vi'  -  vi, h'(v1')  hi 
it follows that vi >  vj  =  h' > hj. Hence by (3.2) h' and (h(vi)  -  q1)  are similarly 
ordered in the sense of Hardy, Littlewood, and Polya [5]; i.e., as one moves up so 
does  the other. Therefore, by  Hardy, Littlewood, and  Polya  [5, p.  43], h' and 
(h (vi) -  q1)  are positively correlated, i.e., 
(3.6)  27Ti  (a)  h'(h (vi) -  q +  A) > (  Ti(a)h/)(E  Ti  (a)(h (vi) -  q +  ii)) 
>0, 
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (1) h' > 0; (2) G(a) +  K(a) 
(7ri  (a) v') <  G  (a')  +  K(a')(E, 71(a') v') =  G  (a)  +  K(a)(2  Ei(a)vi)  (since  the 
agent's expected utility stays constant), which implies that 
lim (1  /X) E  7Ti (a)(vi  -  i)) > 0. 
(3.6) contradicts (3.5). 
This proves that Zgr1(a)h(v1')  < Z wi(a)h(vi), which establishes that the princi- 
pal's expected profit is higher under (I',  .  . ,  I,)  Contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
REMARK  5:  Another  way  of  expressing  Proposition  4  is  that  there  is  no PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  21 
permutation i1, .  .  .,  in of the integers 1, . . . , n such that Ilkis  nondecreasing in 
k,  and  (qiA -  IiA) is  nonincreasing  in  k,  with  Ilk  <  IIA+I,  (qiA  -  IA)  >  (qiA+,  -IiA+) 
for some k. Note  that there is an interesting contrast between Proposition 4 and 
results found  in the literature on optimal risk sharing in the absence  of  moral 
hazard. In this literature (see Borch [4]), it is shown that (if the individuals are 
risk averse) it is optimal for the individuals' returns to be positively related over 
the whole range of outcomes, whereas here we are only able to show that this is 
true over some range of outcomes. 
Proposition 4 may be used to establish the following result about the monoton- 
icity of the optimal incentive scheme. 
PROPOSITION  5:  Assume  A1-A3  and  V strictly  concave.  Let  (II,  ...  ,  In) be  a 
second-best optimal incentive  scheme. Then (1) there exists 1 <  i <  n -  1 such that 
Ii <  Ii+I,  with  strict  inequality  unless  II =2=  *  =In;  (2)  there  exists  1 <  j 
<  n-1  such  that  q. -  Ij <  q  j+  I - 
PROOF:  (1) follows directly from Proposition 4. So does (2) once we rule out 
the  case  q1 -  II  =  q2 -  I2  =  .  =  qn-  In. We  do  this  by  a similar  argument  to 
that  used  in  Proposition  4.  Suppose  that  I  is  an  optimal  incentive  scheme 
satisfying 
(3.7)  q1-II  = q2-1I2  =  qn-In  = k 
Then I,  <  I2  <  .  .  .  <  In.  Consider the new incentive scheme I'  =  (II +  E,  I2 + 
E,  ...  .,  In-I  +  E,In  -  [E)  where  E > 0  and  y  is chosen  so  that  maxaeA  [G(a) + 
K(a)(Z'ii(a)  V(Ij))] = maxA EA  [G(a) + K(a)(Z'ii(a)  V(I,))],  i.e.  the  agent's  ex- 
pected  utility is kept constant. We  show that the principal's expected profit is 
higher under I'  than under I  for small E.  Suppose not. Then 
7Ti(a')(4i 
-  Ii')  <  Z7Ti(a)(q1 
- 
J)  =  k, 
where a' (resp. a) is optimal for the agent under I'  (resp. I).  Substituting for I' 
yields 
-(1  -  Tn  (a'))E  +  wn(a')  LE <  0. 
Take limits as E -  0.  Without loss of generality a' -  a'. Hence we have 
(3.8)  -  (1  -  qTn(A))  +  Tn(  A)  tu  <  0. 
Now  since  a'  is  an  optimal  action  for  the  agent  under  I',  it  follows  by 
uppersemicontinuity that a is optimal under I.  Hence we have 
G(a)  +  K(a)(  a7T1(a) V(1'  ))  <  G(a')  +  K(a')  Ti(a)  V(Ii')) 
=  G(a)  +  (  A 
i(A)  V(ji 
Hence  ar1(  )( V(L) -V(IJ'))  > 0. Using the concavity of  V and taking limits as 22  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
E -  0,  we get 
n-I 
E  ,ia  V  I  -R  a) V, (In 
But since V'(Ii) is decreasing in i, this contradicts (3.8). (If V is not differentiable, 
V' denotes the right-hand derivative.) 
This proves that the principal does better under I'  than under I.  Hence  we 
have ruled out the case q-  =  * **=  -  In. This establishes Proposition 5. 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5 says that it is not optimal for the agent's marginal reward as a 
function of income to be negative everywhere or to be greater than or equal to 
one  everywhere.8 However,  the proposition  does  allow  for the possibility  that 
either of  these conditions  can hold  over some interval. To  see when  this may 
occur, it is useful to consider in more detail the case where A is a finite set. When 
A  is  finite,  we  can  use  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions  for  problem  (2.2)  to 
characterize the optimum. If Assumption A3 holds and h is differentiable, these 
yield: 
(3.9)  h'(v1) =  lX  +  E  Yj  K(a*)  -E  [t  (  a)  I  for  ) ) 
[  aj  EA  Jaj  EA  7Tj(a*)) frl, 
L  aj =,P+  a*  aj  =,,+aa* 
where X,  ( y>)  are nonnegative Lagrange multipliers and yj > 0 only if the agent is 
indifferent between a* and aj at the optimum. The following proposition states 
that yj > 0 for at least one action which is less costly than a*. This implies that at 
an optimum the agent must be indifferent between at least two actions (unless a* 
is the least costly action, i.e. where there is no incentive problem). 
PROPOSITION 6:  Assume A1-A3  and A finite. Suppose that (2.2) has a solution 
for a* E  A.  Then if CFB  (a*) > mina  eA CFB  (a),  this solution will have the property 
that G(a*) +  K(a*)( >I  rj(a*)vj)  =  G(aj) +  K(aj)(n=ITi1  (aj) vi) for some a. E  A 
with CFB(a1)  <  CFB(a*).  Furthermore,  if V is strictly concave and differentiable,  the 
Lagrange multiplier  ,uj  will be strictly  positive for some aj with CFB(aj)  <  CFB(a*). 
PROOF:  Suppose that the agent strictly prefers a* to all actions less costly than 
a*  at the solution. Then, since (2.2) is a convex problem, we can  drop all the 
constraints  in  (2.2)  which  refer  to  less  costly  actions  without  affecting  the 
8Among other things, Proposition 5 shows that it is not optimal to have ql -II  =  q2-  I2= 
=  q-  I,.  This result has also been established by Shavell [20] under stronger assumptions. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  23 
solution. In other words, we can substitute A' =  (a  E A I  a is at least as costly as 
a*}  for A in (2.2) and the solution will not change. But since a* is now the least 
costly action, we know from the proof of Proposition 1 that it is optimal to set 
Ii =  Ij for all i, j.  However, Ii = Ij is not optimal for the original problem since, 
under these conditions, the agent will pick an a which minimizes CFB(a), and by 
assumption CFB (a*)  >  mina  EA CFB  (a). Contradiction. 
That Ai  > 0 follows from the fact that if all the yj = 0, then h'(vi) is the same 
for all i, which implies that I1 =  ..  =  In; however, this means that the agent 
will  choose  a  cost-minimizing action,  contradicting  CFB(a*)  >  minaEA  CFB(a). 
Q.E.D. 
It should be noted that Proposition 6 depends strongly on the assumption that 
A is finite. 
The simplest  case occurs when yj > 0 for just one aj with CFB(aj)  <  CFB(a*) 
(this will be true in particular if A contains only two actions). In this case, we can 
rewrite (3.9) as 
(3.10)  h'(vi)  =  (X +  tt)K(a*)  -  ttK(aj)  -(  a*  . 
We  see  that  what  determines  vi,  and  hence  Ii,  in  this  case  is  the  relative 
likelihood  that  the  outcome  q =  qi results  from  a1  rather  than  from  a*.  In 
particular, since h convex =X h' nondecreasing in vi, a sufficient condition for the 
optimal  incentive  scheme  to  be  nondecreasing  everywhere, i.e.  I, <  '2  <  ?  .. 
<In,  is that gi(aj)/1i(a*)  is nonincreasing in i, i.e. the relative likelihood that 
a =  a1 rather than a =  a* produces the outcome q =  qi is lower the better is the 
outcome i. 
This  observation has  led  some  to  suggest that  the  following  is  a  sufficient 
conditon for the incentive scheme to be nondecreasing. 
MONOTONE LIKELIHOOD  RATIO  CONDITION (MLRC):  Assume  A3.  Then 
MLRC  holds  if,  given a, a' E A,  CFB (a')  <  CFB (a)  implies that 7Ti  (a')/7Ti(a)  is 
nonincreasing  in  i. 
It should be noted that the "first-order condition" approach described in the 
introduction,  which  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  agent  is  indifferent 
between a and a +  da at an optimum, does yield MLRC as a sufficient condition 
for monotonicity.9 We now show, however, that, once we take into account the 
possibility  that  the  agent  may  be  indifferent  between  several  actions  at  an 
9See Mirrlees [11] or Holmstrom [7]. Milgrom [9] has shown that MLRC, as stated here, implies 
the differential version of the monotone likelihood condition which is to be found in Mirrlees [11] or 
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optimum, i.e. yj > 0 for more than one aj, MLRC does not guarantee monotonic- 
ity. 
EXAMPLE  1: A =  {a1, a2, a3},  n = 3.  7T(a1)  =  23,,  2 ),  T(a2)=(-}43  3),  7T(a3) 
=  ( ll2 4,  2 ).  Assume  additive  separability  with  G(a1) =0,  G(a2) =-(  V 
+  7/4),  G(a3)=-17/4,  V(I) =  (3I)1/3  (i.e.  h(v)  =  4v3),K(a)  -  and 
U  =  2  +  1  7/4.  Note that MLRC is satisfied here.10 
We compute C(a1), C(a2), C(a3).  Obviously, C(a,)  =  CFB(al)=  4(U  -G(a,)) 
=  0.033. To compute C(a2), we use the first-order conditions (3.9). These are 
v2~~~~~~-2 
V1  =-l  +  34  12, 
V2  4  A  I  y  4  A2, 
V3=+  4  Al-  21 
plus  the  complementary  slackness  conditions.  These  equations  are  solved  by 
setting  X = 4,  1  =  2,  A2 =  1. This  yields  v, = 0,  v2  =  ,  V3  =  7/4,  and  the 
agent is then indifferent between a,,  a2, and a3: 
3v  +lv2+  v3+  G(a)  =4  v+2  +  2  V3  +  G(a2) 
=  12  V  +  4V2 +  233  +  G(a3)  =  U. 
Since the first-order conditions  are necessary and  sufficient, we may conclude 
that C(a2)=  (3v+  V3+  v3)=  0.571. 
Note  that  the  incentive  scheme  which  implements  a2,  I=  0,  I2 =  23/2, 
I3 =  3 (  )3/2,  is not nondecreasing. 
Observe that  C(a3) >  CFB(a3) =  l(U  -  G(a3))3 = 0.635 >  C(a2).  Since  C(a3) 
>  C(a2) >  C(a,),  it  is  easy  to  show  that we  can  find  q1 <  q2 <  q3 such  that 
B(a2) -  C(a2)  > max[B(a3) -  C(a3), B(a,)  -  C(a,)].  But  this  means  that  it  is 
optimal for the principal to get the agent to pick a2. Hence the optimal incentive 
scheme is as described above. It is not nondecreasing despite the satisfaction of 
MLRC. 
The  reason that monotonicity  breaks down in  Example  1 is because,  at the 
optimum, the agent is indifferent between a2, the action to be implemented, a1  a 
less costly action,  and a3 a more costly  action.  By  MLRC  gr (a1)fir(a2),  gi(a2) 
/1,g(a3)  are decreasing in i. However, Aj(7Tr(aj)f7Tw(a2))  +  2(qTi(a3)/i(a2))  need 
not be monotonic. 
This observation suggests that one way  to get monotonicity  is to  strengthen 
MLRC so that it holds for weighted combinations of actions as well as for the 
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basic actions themselves. In particular, suppose that 
(3.11)  given any finite subset { al,  .  . . , am } of A, a E A, 
and nonnegative weights wl,  ...  .,  Wm  summing to 1, 
it is the case that (  Wj7Ti(aj)/Ti(a)) 
is either nondecreasing in i  or nonincreasing in i. 
Then, by the first-order conditions (3.9), 
(3.12)  h'(v1) =  X +  j K(a*)  -  lAj  K(aj)  L 
7j  7(aj) 
aj EA  aj EA  aj EA 
where 
Wj  = 
ttjK  (aj)/  E  hK(ah). 
ah E A 
ah  #  a* 
But, by (3.1  1), the right-hand side (RHS) of (3.12) is monotonic.  Hence, the v,'s 
are  either  monotonically  nondecreasing  or  nonincreasing.  By  Proposition  5, 
however, they cannot be nonincreasing; hence they are nondecreasing. 
Unfortunately,  (3.11)  turns out  to  be  a  very strong condition.  In  fact,  it  is 
equivalent to the following spanning condition. 
SPANNING  CONDITION  (SC):  There  exists  T,  4' E S  such  that  (1)  for  each 
aeA,  EA  (a)=X(a)47+(1-X(a))47'  for  some  O<X(a)<1;  (2)  7/Til'T is  nonin- 
creasing  in  i. 
That  SC implies (3.11)  is  easy  to  see.  We  are grateful to  Jim  Mirrlees for 
pointing out and proving the converse.'  1 
PROPOSITION  7: Assume Al-A3,  V strictly concave and differentiable. Suppose 
that SC holds. Then a second-best optimal incentive  scheme satisfies II <  I2 <  ?  .  . 
<  In. 
PROOF:  If A is finite, the argument following (3.12) establishes the result. To 
establish the result for the case A  infinite, let a E A  be  a second-best  optimal 
l  To prove the converse, define a <  a' if ?r,(a')/Ir,(a) is nondecreasing in i. (3.11) implies that  5 is 
a complete pre-ordering on A. Furthermore,  z  is continuous. Since A is compact, there exist a, a E  A 
such that a <  a <  a for all a E  A. Given a E A, consider X(?T, ()/r,  (a)) + (1 -X)(Q,(a)/r,  (a)).  When 
A =  1, this is nondecreasing in i, and when A = 0, it is nonincreasing in i. Furthermore, (3.11) implies 
that it is monotonic in i for all 0 < A <  1. It follows by continuity that it is independent of i for some 
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action and let I  be the second-best optimal incentive scheme which implements 
it.  By  Remark 2  of  Section  2,  I  is  unique.  Let Ar be  a  finite  subset  of  A 
containing a such  that the  Euclidean distance between Ar and A  is less  than 
(1/r).  Let Ir be the second-best optimal incentive scheme which implements a 
when  the agent is restricted to  choosing  from Ar. From  Proposition 7  for the 
finite A  case,  we  know  that Ir is  nondecreasing.  Take  limits  as  r -4  0.  It  is 
straightforward  to show that Ir -  I. It follows that I is nondecreasing.  Q.E.D. 
An alternative sufficient condition for monotonicity may be found in the work 
of Mirrlees [12], who establishes a similar result to Proposition 8 below. For each 
a E A, let F(a)  =  (7T,(a), 7Tw(a)  +  7T2(a),  . ..  ,  7TI(a)  +  * * * +  w"j(a)). In the follow- 
ing proposition, the notation F(a)  >  F'(a)  is used to mean Fi(a) >  F,'(a) for all 
=  1,  ...  , n. 
CONCAVITY  OF DISTRIBUTION  FUNCTION  CONDITION  (CDFC):  CDFC  holds if 
a,a',a"  EA,  and 
(U  -G(a)  )  -  (U  G(a/))  +  (1  -  )(U  G(a/)) 
(  K(a)  )  (  K(a')  )(  K(a")) 
O<X<  1, 
imply that F(a)  < XF(a') + (1 -  X)F(a"). 
PROPOSITION  8: Assume A1-A3,  V strictly concave and differentiable.  Assume 
also  that  U  is  additively or  multiplicatively separable, i.e.,  either  G(a) 0_  or 
K(a)  constant. Suppose that  MLRC  and  CDFC  hold.  Then  a  second-best 
optimal incentive  scheme (II,  . ..  , In) satisfies I, < I2<  ?  ..  < In. 
PROOF:  Assume  first  that  A  is  finite.  Let  a*  maximize  B(a)  -  C(a).  Let 
A' =  {a E A I  CFB(a)  <  CFB(a*)}.  Consider the cost  minimizing way  of  getting 
the agent to pick a* given that he can choose only from A'. It is clear from (3.9) 
that, since qTi(aj)/qTi(a*) is nonincreasing in i by MLRC,  the incentive  scheme 
(II,  ...  , In) is nondecreasing. We will be home if we can show that (II,  ..  .,  In) 
is optimal when A'  is replaced by A.  Since adding actions cannot reduce the cost 
of implementing a*, all we have to do is to show that (II,  . ..  , In) continues to 
implement a*, i.e. there does not exist a", CFB(a")  >  CFB(a*),  such that 
(3.13)  G(a") +  K(a")(w,E  7Tj(a")vj)  >  G(a*)  + K(a*)(EqTi  (a*)vi). 
However, we know from Propositions 2 and 6 that 
(3.14)  G(a*)  +  K(a*)(Z7Tj(a*)vj)  =  G(a') +  K(a')(ET7Ti(a')v1)  =  U 
for some a' with CFB(a')  <  CFB(a*).  Writing 
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and using CDFC  and the fact that vj  <  v2  <  <  v,  we get 
qTia*  (i  U -G(a)) 
> XZ7Tj(a")v1+  (1-  X)(Xegn(a')v,)  -  (  -G(a*)) 
=X  X27T(a")vi  -  K(U  ) 
+  (l-X)  E7Tj(a')vi 
-  (  U-G(a') 
But this contradicts (3.13) and (3.14). 
To prove the result for A finite, one again proceeds by way of finite approxi- 
mation.  Q.E.D. 
To  understand  CDFC,  consider,  for  each  a E  A,  V(CFB(a))  =((U  -G(a)) 
/K(a)).  In utility terms V(CFB(a))  is  a  measure  of  the  first-best  cost  of  getting 
the agent to pick a. CDFC says that if a is a convex combination of a' and a" in 
terms of this measure of cost then the distribution function of outcomes  corre- 
sponding to a  dominates in the sense of  first degree stochastic dominance  the 
corresponding convex combination of the distribution functions corresponding to 
a'  and a". It is worth noting that under the assumption of additive or multiplica- 
tive separability in Proposition 8, the X in the CDFC  definition is independent 
of  U. 
So  far we  have  considered  only  the  monotonicity  of  the  optimal  incentive 
scheme.  One  would  also  like  to  know  when  the  optimal  incentive  scheme  is 
progressive, i.e.  (II  -  i)/(q+I  -  qi)  is  nonincreasing  in  i,  or  regressive, i.e. 
(I+j  -  i)/(qi+l  -  qi) is nondecreasing in i. To get results about this, one needs 
considerably stronger assumptions, as the following proposition indicates. 
PROPOSITION  9:  Assume Al-A3,  V strictly concave and differentiable.  Assume 
also  that  U  is  additively or  multiplicatively separable, i.e.,  either  G(a) 0_  or 
K(a)  constant. Suppose that MLRC  and  CDFC  hold and  that (qi+I -  qi) is 
independent  of i, 1 <  i <  n -  1. Then a second-best optimal incentive  scheme will be 
regressive  (resp. progressive) if 
(3.15)  (1/  V'(I))  is concave (resp. convex) in I and a,a'  E  A, 
CFB  (a') <  CFB (a), implies that (7Tj+  1(a')/ rj+ 1(a)) -  (7rj(a')/7Tj(a)) 
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PROOF:  Assume first that A is finite. Let a* be a second-best optimal action. 
Let a'  maximize  CFB(a)  subject to  CFB(a)  <  CFB(a*),  i.e.  a'  is  the next  most 
costly  action  after a*.  Consider the cost  minimizing way  of  implementing a* 
given that a' is the only other action that the agent can choose. Using the same 
concavity  argument as  in  the  proof  of  Proposition  8,  we  can  show  that  the 
resulting incentive scheme (II,  . ..  , I)  also implements a* when the agent can 
choose from all of A. Hence (I  . . .,  I)  is an optimal incentive scheme. 
By (3. 10), 
V'(I )  = h'(vi) =  (X  + [t)K(a*)  -  [(a')  (a *) 
and so 
1  -  1  -  K('  ) i(  TE?1(a*)  _  7r(a )  ) 
(3.15) now follows immediately. To prove the result for the A infinite case, one 
again proceeds by way of a finite approximation.  Q.E.D. 
Note  that  I/V'  is  linear if  V=logI;  is  concave  if  V=  -e',  a >0,  or 
V=  I',  0 <  a <  1; is convex if  V =  -I-,  a >  1. 
It should also be noted that Mirrlees [12] has shown that if CDFC  holds, the 
"first-order condition" approach referred to  in  the introduction is  valid. Thus 
Propositions 8 and 9 can also be proved by appealing to the characterization of 
an  optimal incentive  scheme  to  be  found  in  much  of  the literature (see,  e.g., 
Holmstrom [7] and Mirrlees [11]). 
Let us summarize the results of this section. We have shown that an optimal 
incentive  scheme will not  be  declining  everywhere, but  that  only  under quite 
strong  assumptions  (SC  or  MLRC  plus  concavity)  will  it  be  nondecreasing 
everywhere. We have also shown that it is not optimal for the agent's marginal 
remuneration for an extra pound of profit to exceed one everywhere, although it 
may exceed one sometimes. Finally, we have obtained  sufficient conditions  for 
the incentive scheme to be progressive or regressive. 
The conclusion that only under strong assumptions will the optimal incentive 
scheme  be  monotonic  may  seem  disappointing  at  first  sight.  One  feels  that 
monotonicity  is  a  minimal  requirement. This  may  not  be  the  right reaction, 
however. There are many interesting situations where it is clear that the optimal 
scheme will not be monotonic. We have described one example in the introduc- 
tion.  Another  example  is  the  following.  Suppose  that  actions  are  two  dimen- 
sional, with one dimension referring to how hard the agent works and the other 
dimension to how cautious he is-greater  caution might lead to a lower variance 
of profit but also to a lower mean. The optimal action for the principal might 
involve the agent working fairly hard and also not being too cautious. The best PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  29 
way to implement this may be to pay the agent high amounts for both very good 
outcomes  (to  encourage  high  effort)  and  very  bad  outcomes  (to  discourage 
excessive caution). This example seems far from pathological. In fact, one might 
argue that a number of real world incentive schemes operate in this way. In view 
of  examples like this, the difficulty of  finding general conditions  guaranteeing 
monotonicity may become less surprising.12 
In the next section, we show that considerably stronger results than those of 
this section can be proved for the case n = 2. We also provide a simple algorithm 
for computing optimal incentive schemes when n = 2. 
4.  THE CASE OF TWO OUTCOMES 
When  n = 2,  we  will  refer to  q,  as  the  "bad" outcome  and  q2>  q,  as  the 
"good" outcome.  In this case, the agent's incentive scheme can be represented 
simply  by  a  fixed  payment  w  and  a  share of  profits, s,  where w + sq1 =  II, 
w + sq2  =  I2'  i.e., s = (I2-  Il)/(q2-  q1). Proposition 5 of the last section shows 
that it is not optimal for Ii to be everywhere declining in qi. When n =  2,  this 
means that s >  0.13  Similarly the proposition implies that s <  1 when n =  2. This 
has a number of interesting implications. 
DEFINITION:  Let n = 2. We  say that a E A  is efficient if there does not  exist 
a' E A  satisfying  CFB(a')  <  CFB (a)  and  7T2(a')  >  7T2(a), with  at  least  one  strict 
inequality. 
In other words, an action is efficient if the probability of a good outcome can 
only be increased by incurring greater cost. 
PROPOSITION 10: Assume A1-A3  and V strictly concave. Let n = 2. Then every 
second-best optimal action is efficient. 
PROOF: Let a be  a second-best  optimal  action.  Then  a maximizes  G(a)  +  K(a) 
[7gI(a)v1 +  7g,(a)v2].  Suppose  CFB(a') <  CFB(a)  and 7T2(a')  >  7T2(a), with at least 
one strict inequality. Then, by the definition of CFB, 
G(a)  +  K(a)  V(CFB  (a))  =  U =  G(a') + K(a)  V(CFB  (a')) 
<  G(a') + K(a)  V(CFB  (a)) 
12There  are some cases where monotonicity may be a constraint on the optimal incentive scheme. 
An  example is where the agent can always make a better outcome  look  like a worse outcome  by 
reducing the firm's profits after the outcome has occurred. This case can be analyzed by adding the 
(linear) constraints v1 <  v2 <  .  .<  vn to the problem (2.2). 
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since CFB(a')  <  CFB(a). Hence, by Assumption A1(4),  G(a) + K(a)v  <  G(a') + 
K(a')v  for all v E 9t.  Therefore using the fact that v1 <  v2 since s > 0, and the 
fact that 7T2(a')  >  72(a), we have 
G(a)  +  K(a)[7T,(a)v  2  +  72(a)V2 
<  G(a')  +  K(+)[7T,(a)vl+  7T2(a)V2] 
<  G(a')  +  K(a')  7T,(a')v,+  7T2(a')V2 
with  at  least  one  strict inequality  unless  CFB(a)=  CFB(a')  and  v1 =  v2.  This 
contradicts the optimality of a unless CFB(a) =  CFB(a') and v1 =  v2. However, in 
this case, the agent is indifferent between a and a', while the principal prefers a', 
again contradicting the optimality of a.  Q.E.D. 
We  may use  Proposition  10 to prove that when  n = 2  it will never pay  the 
principal to offer the agent an expected utility in excess of  U (recall that when 
n > 2  this is only  generally true when  U(a, I)  is additively  or multiplicatively 
separable-see  Proposition 2). 
PROPOSITION 11: Assume A1-A3  and V strictly concave. Let n = 2. Let a' be a 
second-best optimal action and I  a  second-best optimal incentive scheme which 
implements  a.  Then  a  =  U. 
PROOF: Suppose  not,  i.e.,  Ei=Ii  (A)  U(aA,  I)  >  U.  Consider a  new  incentive 
scheme (I,I2)  =  (II  -  ,I2)  where e > 0 is small. Let a be an optimal action for 
the agent  under  the new  scheme,  i.e., a maximizes  G(a)  +  K(a)[,g1(a)  V(I  -  e)  + 
J2(a)  V(I2)]. Then, 
,(a)(q,  -  II  +  E)  +  7T2(a)(q2  -  I2)  >  7(a)(q,  -  II)  +  7T2(a)(q2  -  I2) 
>  7T-(a)(q  -II)  +  7T2(a)(q2  -  I2) 
as  long  as  7T2(a^)  <  7T2(a) (since  0 < s <  1). Thus,  if  we  can  show  that  72(a) 
7T2(a),  we will have contradicted the optimality of (I,, I2), since the principal's 
profits will be higher under (I,  I2) than under (I,,  I2). 
Suppose 7J2(a) >  7T2(a).  Now  the same argument as in  Proposition  10 shows 
that a  is  efficient.  Thus  we  must  have  CFB(a^)  >  CFB(a).  Hence  G(a) +  K(a) 
V(CFB(a)) =  U =  G(a)  +  K(ac) V(CFB(a))  >  G(al)  +  K(a) V(CFB(a)),  and so, by 
Assumption A1(4), 
(4.1)  G(a)  +  K(a)v  >  G(al)  +  K(a^)v 
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bers, we may conclude from (4.1) that K(a) <  K(a'). Now by revealed preference, 
(4.2)  G(a)  + K(a)[7T,(a)V(IA)  +  qr2(a)V(I2)] 
<G(a^)  +  K(ii)[7Ti(i(I)  V(+T)  I2) 
(4.3)  G(a)  +  K(a)[  (a)  +  T2(a)V(I2)] 
>  G(a^)  +  K(ii)[rTi(a) V(1  -a)  +  7T2(A)V(I2) 
Subtracting (4.3)  from  (4.2)  yields  K(a)lE  '(a)  V  K(a)71(a).  Hence,  since  72(a) 
>  7T2(a)  by assumption, K(a)  <  K(a^).  However, rewriting (4.2), we obtain 
G(a)  +  K(a)v5  +K(a)[TI(a)(V(IVl) 
-  1)  +  7T2(a)(V(I2)  ] 
<  G(a^)  +  K(a)i5  +K(a)[T(a)(V(I  )A-)  + 7t2(a)(V(12)-1)] 
where v = sup6Qt.  (Note  that 1 <  oo, for  3  =  oo and K(a)  <  K(a)  violate (4.1).) 
Setting v -v  in (4.1), we may conclude that 
A  A 
K(a)7gl(a)(V(Il)  -  U)  +  K(a)7T2(a)(V(I2)  -  1) 
<K(a)Tl(a^)(V(I,)  -  1) +  K(a-  ) 
But this is impossible  since K(a)7T1(a)  <  K(ac)7I( A), K(a)  <  K(S),  a2(a) K  7T2(a), 
V(I)  -  <  0,  V(I2)  -  1 <  0.  We  have  thus  shown  that  a2(a)> 7T2(a),  which 
contradicts the optimality of (I  , I2).  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 11 tells us that the agent's fixed payment w is determined once s is. 
In particular, w will be the unique solution of 
max[G(a)  +  K(a)(7Tr(a)  V(w + sqI) +  7T2(a)V(w + sq2))] =  U 
We have shown that one implication of Proposition 5 for the case n = 2 is that 
gvery second-best optimal action is efficient. We consider now a second impli- 
cation. Suppose that we start off in the situation where the agent has access to a 
set of actions A, and now some additional actions become available, so that the 
new action set is A' D A. Then, if the new actions are all higher cost actions for 
the agent than those in A-in  the sense that their CFB's  are higher-the  principal 
cannot be made worse off by such a change. 
PROPOSITION  12:  Assume  Al  and  A2.  Let  n =  2.  Suppose  that A'  D  A  and  that 
a E  A, a' E A'\A  => CFB(a') >  CFB(a). Assume that A3 holds for both A and A'. 
Then maxaEA{B(a)  -  C'(a)] >  maxaeA  [B(a)  -  C(a)],  where C'  is  the second- 
best cost function under  A'. 
PROOF: Suppose (I,  I2) is an optimal second-best incentive scheme when the 
action set is A. Let the principal keep this incentive scheme when the new actions 32  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
A'\A  are added. The only way that the principal can be made worse off is if the 
agent now switches from a E A  to a' E  A'\A.  But a' must then provide higher 
utility for the agent, i.e., G(a') + K(a')[7T(a')v, +  T2(a')v2] >  G(a) +  K(a)[7T,(a) 
vI +  7T2(a)v2].  Since CFB(a') >  CFB(a), however, G(a') +  K(a')v  <  G(a) +  K(a)v 
for  all  v E  9t  (by  Assumption  A1(4)).  Hence  7T,(a')v,  +  72(a')v2  >  7T(a)vl  + 
7T2(a)v2,  which implies, since v2  >  vI by Proposition 5, that 7T2(a')  >  7J2(a).  But it 
follows  that the principal's expected profits 7T,(q,  -  II)  +  7T2(q2 -I2)  rise when 
the agent moves  from a  to a'  since, again by  Proposition 5, s <  1, i.e. q2  -  I2 
>  q, -II.  Q.E.D. 
As  a  final  implication  of  Proposition  5,  when  n = 2,  consider  a  manager- 
entrepreneur who initially owns  100 per cent of a firm, i.e. wV  = 0, s =  1. In the 
absence of any risk-sharing possibilities the manager will choose a to maximize 
7T1(a)  U(a, qI) +  72(a) U(a, q2). Let J be a solution to this. Clearly a is efficient. 
Now  suppose a risk neutral principal appears with whom the manager can share 
risks. We know from Proposition 5 that at the new optimum s <  1 = s. There- 
fore,  by  Lemma  1 and  Proposition  11, 72(a*) <  72(a).  In  addition,  CFB(a*) 
<  CFB(aD)  by Proposition 10. Thus, the existence of risk-sharing  possibilities leads 
the  agent  to  choose  a  less  costly  action  with  a  lower  probability  of  a  good 
outcome. 
We  may  use  Propositions  10-12  to  develop  a  method  for  computing  a 
second-best optimal incentive scheme when n = 2. Consider the case where A is 
finite.  Recall  that  Proposition  6  states  that,  in  this  case,  the  agent  will  be 
indifferent between a* and some less costly action. This fact makes the computa- 
tion  of  an  optimal  incentive  scheme  fairly  straightforward. We  know  from 
Proposition 10 that it is never optimal to get the agent to choose an inefficient 
action. Hence we can assume without loss of generality that CFB(al)  <  CFB(a2) 
<  ...  <  CFB(am)  and  7T2(aI) <  7T2(a2) <  ...<  K  2(am).  The  computation  of 
C(a,)  is easy: by Remark 1 of  Section 2 it is just  CFB(al).  To  compute  C(ak), 
k >  1, we use Propositions 6 and 11. For each action aj, j  <  k, find,,,  I2  so that 
the agent is indifferent between ak  and aj and the agent's expected utility is  U. 
This means solving 
G(ak)  +  K(ak)(7Tl(ak)Vl  +  7T2(ak)V2)  U, 
(4.4) 
G(aj) +  K(aj)(7gI(aj)v  +  7T2(aj)V2)  =  Us 
which yields 
7T2(aJ)(U  -  G(ak))/lK(ak))  -  7T2(ak)((  U -  G(a,))/K(aj)) 
V1 =  71(ak)  -7l(aj) 
(4.5) 
7T,(aj)U  -  G(ak))/K(ak))  - 7T1(ak)((  U -  G(a,))/K(aj)) 
V2 =  772(ak)  -7T2(a) 
We then set I,  =  h(v1),  I2  =  h(v2).  Note  that  v1 <  v2  in (4.5) so that I,  <  I2. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  33 
V2 
Irl(aJ2)vl  +  Z2(aj2)V2  =(U-G(aj2)  )/K(a12) 
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FIGURE 2. 
Doing  this  for  each j  =  1, .  .  .,  k -  1  yields  (k -  1)  different  (vI,v2)  (and 
(II'  I2)) pairs, each with v1 <  v2. This is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case k =  3, 
where the (v1, v2) pairs are at A, B. We know from Proposition 6 that one of these 
pairs is the solution to (2.2). In fact, the solution must occur at the (vI, v2) pair 
with the smallest  v, (and hence, by (4.4), with the largest v2)-denote  this pair by 
Iv  5 '2).  To see this, suppose that the agent is indifferent between ak and aj under 
(I  v2). Consider the expression 
(4.6)  '7l(ak)Vl  +  7T2(ak)V2 -7T,(aj)v  -7T2(aj)V2 
-  (7T(ak)  -  7T(aj))V1  +  (7T2(ak)  -  7T2(aj))V2 
When  v1 = 
A 
=  v2'  this  expression  equals  [(U  -  G(ak))/K(ak)]-[(U- 
G(aj))/K(aj)].  Suppose  now  that v1 >  v  v2 K v2. Then (4.6) falls since 71(ak) 
<  7T,(aj).  Hence the agent now prefers aj to ak  and so ak is not implemented. 
In Figure 2, the solution is at A.  (The solution could not be at B  since it is 
clear from the diagram that, at B, a12 gives the agent an expected utility greater 
than U, i.e. ak  is not implemented at B.) Note  that it is possible that the (VA,  ,v 
picked in this way does not lie in 91t  x  9t;  i.e., h(vA,)  or h(vA2)  may be undefined. 
In this case,  the constraint set of  (2.2) is empty and  so  C(ak)=  x.  If  (vs,v2) 
91t x  91,  then the principal's minimum expected cost of  getting the agent to 
pick ak is C(ak)  =  gl(ak)h(Al)  +  gl(ak)h(  A2). The expected net benefits of imple- 
menting ak  are B(ak)  -  C(ak).  This procedure must be undergone for each  ak5 34  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
k =  1,..  ,  m.  Finally,  the  overall optimum  is  determined by  selecting  the  a 
which maximizes B(ak)  -  C(ak). 
REMARK  6:  In  computing  the  cost  of  implementing  ak,  we  have  ignored 
actions which are more costly for the agent than ak.  This means that the cost 
function  which  we  have  computed  is  not  the  true cost  function  C(a)  but  a 
modified cost function C(a). Clearly, C(a) <  C(a) for each a since more actions 
can only make implementation more difficult. On the other hand, Proposition 12 
tells  us  that  maxaEA[B(a)  -  C(a)]  < maxaeA [B(a)  -  C(a)].  Combining  these 
yields  maxaEA  [B(a)  -  C(a)]  =  maxaEaA  [B(a)-  C(a)],  which  means  that  we  are 
justified in working with C(a)  instead of C(a). 
Another  case  where computation  is  quite  simple is  when A  is  infinite  and 
{  CFB  (a) I  a  E  A } is an interval [c, c] of the real line. For reasons of space, we do 
not cover this case. 
Unfortunately, the computational techniques presented above  do not appear 
to generalize in a useful way to the case n > 2. In order to compute an optimum 
when n > 2, in the finite action case, it seems that we must, for each a E  A, solve 
the  convex  problem  in  (2.2)  and  then,  by  inspection,  find  the  a & A  which 
maximizes B(a)  -  C(a).  If A is infinite, one takes a finite approximation. These 
steps can be carried out on a computer, although the amount of computer time 
involved when the number of elements of A is large may be considerable. 
One case where a considerable simplification can be achieved when n >  2 is 
where MLRC and CDFC hold. Then the solution to (2.2) has the property that 
(1) if A is finite, the agent is indifferent only between a*,  the action the principal 
wants  to  implement,  and  a',  where  a'  maximizes  CFB  (a)  subject  to  CFB  (a) 
<  CFB(a*), i.e.  a'  is  the  next  most  costly  action  after a*  (see  the  proof  of 
Proposition 8); (2) if A  is convex,  then a*  is the unique maximizer of  G(a) + 
K(a)(Evi(a)V(Il)),  and  [d(G(a*)  +  K(a*)(E7ri(a*)V(I,)))/da]  = 0  is  a  neces- 
sary and sufficient condition for the agent to pick a*. In the latter case, Mirrlees 
[12] has shown that the first-order condition approach referred to in the introduc- 
_tion  is valid. 
One may ask also whether Propositions 10 and 12 hold in the case n > 2. The 
answer is no  (but  see  Remark 7  below).  Second-best  optimal  actions  may  be 
inefficient;  i.e., there may exist lower cost actions which dominate the optimal 
action in the sense of first degree stochastic dominance.14  Also  the addition of 
actions  costlier  than  the  second-best  optimal  action  may  make  the  principal 
worse off  (in  Example  1, the principal's expected profits increase if  action  a3 
14LetA =  {a1,a2,a3},  n = 3. Assume CFB(aI)  <  CFB(a2)  <  CFB(a3),  and that 7r(aI)  =  (3/4,  1/8, 
1/8),  7r(a2)  =  (1/3,  1/3,  1/3),  qr(a3) =  (1/2,  1/2,  0)  (Assumption  A3  is  violated,  but  this  is 
unimportant.) Then C(al)  =  CFB(al) since a,  is the least cost action, and C(a3) =  CFB(a3) since a3 
can  be  implemented by  setting II =  I2,  I3 =  - oo.  However,  C(a2) >  CFB(a2)  and,  in  fact,  if  the 
agent is very risk averse, C(a2) will be so big that it is profitable for the principal to implement a3 
rather than a2 (the effect of risk aversion on C(a)  is discussed in Section 5). This is in spite of the fact 
that a3 is inefficient relative to a2. PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  35 
becomes  unavailable to the agent). Finally, as Shavell [19] has noted  the agent 
may choose a higher cost action when there are opportunities to share risks with 
a principal than in the absence of these opportunities. 
REMARK 7:  It is interesting to note that it is possible to extend all the results of 
the n = 2 case to the n > 2 case when the spanning condition (SC) holds. This is 
because when SC holds, both the principal and the agent are essentially choosing 
between lotteries of the probability vectors 7T and 7A'. 
In  particular, let  II(vl)  =  min1  ,n7=  IJi  subject to  En7=  I  V(11)?v1;12(v2) 
=  min{7i=  I  I  subject  to  p3= 7  V(h) ? v2.  Now  consider  the  principal's 
minimum  cost  problem  as:  for  each  a*,  choose  v1 and  v2 to  minimize  X(a*) 
1I(vl) + (1 -  X(a*))12(v2)  subject to  (1)  G(a*) + [X(a*)vl + (1 -  X(a*))v2]K(a*) 
>  G(a) + [X(a)vl + (1 -  X(a))v2]K(a) for all a E  A; (2) G(a*) + [X(a*)vl + (1 - 
X(a*))v2]K(a*) >  U. Then the principal's problem looks exactly the same as in 
the  n = 2  case.  Note  that from  stochastic  dominance  (i.e.  part (2)  of  the  SC 
condition) Eni=17Tiqi  <  En?  = 17Tqi, so "state 2" is the good state. We are grateful to 
Bengt Holmstrom for alerting us to the fact that all of the results for the n = 2 
case hold when n > 2 and the Spanning Condition is satisfied. 
5.  WHAT DETERMINES  HOW SERIOUS THE INCENTIVE PROBLEM IS? 
In previous sections, we have  studied the properties of  an optimal incentive 
scheme.  We  turn now  to  a  consideration  of  the  factors  which  determine  the 
magnitude of L, the loss to the principal from being unable to observe the agent's 
action. 
One feels intuitively that the worse is the quality of the information about the 
agent's action that the principal obtains from observing any outcome, the more 
serious will be  the incentive problem. This idea  can  be  formalized as follows. 
Suppose that we start with an incentive problem in which the agent's action set is 
A, his utility function is U, his reservation utility is U, the probability function is 
7T,  and  the  vector  of  outputs  is  q = (ql,  .  . .,  qn). We  denote  this  incentive 
problem by  (A, U, U, 7T,  q). Consider the new incentive problem (A, U, U, r', q') 
where 7T'(a)  = R7T(a)  for all a E A  and R  is an (n x  n) stochastic matrix (here 
7T(a),  7T'(a)  are n dimensional column vectors and the columns of R sum to one). 
Below we show that C'(a) >  C(a)  for all a E A, where unprimed variables refer 
to  the  original incentive  problem  and  primed variables to  the  new  incentive 
problem. 
The transformation from 7g(a) to Rk(a)  corresponds to a decrease in informa- 
tiveness in the sense of Blackwell (see, e.g., Blackwell and Girshick [3]).15 That is, 
if we think of  the actions a E  A  as being parameters with respect to which we 
'5The possibility of using Blackwell's notion of informativeness to characterize the seriousness of 
an incentive problem was suggested by Holmstrom [7]. 36  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
have  a prior probability distribution, then an experimenter who  makes deduc- 
tions about a from observing ql,  ...  ,  qn  would prefer to face the function 7T  than 
the function Rk. 
PROPOSITION 13:  Consider the two incentive  problems (A, U, U, 7T,  q), (A, U, U, 
7 ',q')  and  assume that Assumptions A1-A3  hold for  both. Suppose that 7T'(a) 
=  R7T(a)  for  all  a E A,  where R  is  an  (n x  n)  stochastic matrix.  Then C'(a) 
>  C(a)  for  all  a E A.  Furthermore, if  V is  strictly concave and R ?>  0,16  then 
CFB(a*) > minal ACFB(a)  and C(a*) <  xo  =X C'(a*) >  C(a*). 
PROOF:  Let (I',...  ,  In) be the cost minimizing way of implementing a in the 
primed problem. Suppose that in the unprimed problem, the principal offers the 
agent the following random incentive scheme: for each i, if qi is the outcome, an 
n-sided die will be thrown where the probability of  side j  coming up is rjf, the 
(j,  i)th  element  of R (j  =  1, ...  , n). If sidej  then  comes  up,  you  get Ij.  With  this 
random incentive scheme, the probability of the agent getting Ij' if he chooses a 
particular action  is  the same  as in  the primed problem. Therefore the agent's 
optimal action will be a. Furthermore, the principal's expected costs are the same 
as in the primed problem. This shows that the principal can implement a at least 
as cheaply in the unprimed problem as in the primed problem by using a random 
incentive scheme. The final part of  the proof is to note  that the principal can 
reduce his expected  cost further and  continue  to implement a  by  offering the 
agent  the  perfectly  certain utility level  vi =  E=  rj V(Ij') if  the  outcome  is  qi 
rather than the above lottery. That is, there is a deterministic incentive scheme 
which  is  better  for  the  principal  than  the  above  random  incentive  scheme. 
Q.E.D. 
REMARK  8:  The last part of the proof of Proposition 13 shows that it is never 
desirable under our assumptions for the principal to offer the agent an incentive 
scheme which makes his payment conditional on a particular outcome a lottery 
rather than  a  perfectly  certain  income.17  This  result  may  also  be  found  in 
Holmstrom [7]. 
Note  that  if  g'  =  R7T  and  q'R  =  q,  the  random  variable  q' will  have  the  same 
mean as q. In this case the following is true: 
COROLLARY  1: Make the hypotheses  of Proposition 13. If, in addition, q' is such 
that q'R =  q, we have L'>  L. 
PROOF:  Obvious  since  B'(a)  =  q'77'(a) =  q'R7u(a) =  q7r(a) =  B(a). 
16We use this notation to mean that every element of R is strictly positive. 
17This  result depends strongly on our Assumption Al  that attitudes to income risk are indepen- 
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In the case n =  2,  the transformation X -X g' =  Ru is easy  to interpret. Take 
any  two  actions  a,  a2  E A,  and  consider  the  likelihood  ratio  vector  ('77I(aI) 
/771(a2),  g2(a1)/12(a2)).  Assume without loss of  generality that s1(a1)/s1(a2) 
<  g2(a1)/12(a2).  Then it is easy to show that 
5 1  '7T(al)  '7(a)  1  r '7(al)  2(al)  1 
e  '  L  qrl(2) 
' 
l2(2)  J  UX(2) 
' '2(a2)  ] 
where [x, y] is the interval between x and y.  In other words, the likelihood ratio 
vector becomes less variable in some sense when the stochastic transform R is 
applied. In fact the converse to this is also true: if (5.1) holds, then there exists a 
stochastic matrix R  such that  g'  =  Ru  (see Blackwell and Girshick [3]). When 
n > 2, a simple characterization of this sort does not seem to exist, however. 
One might ask whether a converse to Proposition  13 holds. That is, suppose 
C'(a) >  C(a)  for all a E A  and all concave  utility functions  V. Does  it follow 
that g'(a) =  Rg (a) for all a E A, for some stochastic R? A converse along these 
lines can in fact be established when n =  2. Whether it holds for n > 2, we do not 
know. 
Corollary  1 gives us a  simple way  of  generating worse and  worse incentive 
problems: repeatedly apply stochastic transforms to s.  Suppose that we do this 
using always the same stochastic transform R, when R >>  0 and is invertible. That 
is, we  consider a  sequence  of  incentive problems  1,2, ...,  where in  the mth 
problem  rm (a)  =  R'  -  s (a) for all a E A, and the gross profit vector q,' satisfies 
qmR  m- I =  q (this has a solution since R is invertible). We know from Corollary 1 
that Lm will be increasing in m. The next proposition says that in the limit the 
loss from not being able to observe the agent reaches its maximal level. 
DEFINITION:  Let  L* =  maxaEA(B(a)-  CFB(a))  -  max{B(a')-  CFB(a')  I a' 
minimizes CFB (a) on A }. 
Since C(a') =  CFB(a') if a' minimizes CFB(a), L* is an upper limit on the loss 
to the principal from being unable to observe the agent. The next proposition 
shows  that as  the information q reveals about a  gets smaller and  smaller, the 
principal loses control over the agent, i.e., the agent chooses the least-cost action. 
PROPOSITION 14:  Consider the sequence of incentive  problems (A, U, U, 'Tm,  qm), 
m =  1,2,...,  where  'um(a)  =  Rm-1(a)  for  all  a e  A,  qmRm-l  =  q  for  some 
invertible stochastic  matrix  R  > 0.  Assume  Al,  A2,  and  ,li  (a) > 0  for  all  i 
=  1, . ..  , n, and a E A.  Then if V is not a linear  function, limmoo  Lm =  L*. 
PROOF:  It suffices  to  show  that limmOC(a*)  =  x  for all a*  with  CFB(a*) 
> minaEA CFB(a).  Suppose not for some such a*. Let (Iml,  . ..  , Imn) be the cost 
minimizing  way  of  implementing  a*  in  problem  m.  Then  ijmi(a*)Im,  and 
Z 17mI(a*)V(Im1) are both bounded in m. It follows from Bertsekas [2] that the 
(Imi)  are bounded. Hence without loss of generality we may assume Imi  -  Ii for 38  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
each  i.  It is easy  to  show that, since R  is a  strictly positive  stochastic matrix, 
limm*  RRm-I =  R*  where R*  has  the property that all of  its columns  are the 
same.  Therefore  limmO,.m(a)  = R*gl(a)  =  X  is  independent  of  a.  But  this 
means  limmOOE  iqumi(a*)V(Imi)  = Ei7fiV(Ii) 
=  limmOOE  i'mi(a)V(Imi)  for  all 
a E A. Hence the agent will prefer actions a with CFB(a)  <  CFB(a*)  to a*. This 
contradicts the assumption that the incentive scheme implements a*.  Q.E.D. 
We  turn now  to  a  consideration of  another factor which  influences  L:  the 
agent's degree of risk aversion. Since no incentive problem arises when the agent 
is risk netural, but an incentive problem does arise when the agent is risk averse, 
one is led to ask whether L increases as the agent becomes more risk averse. One 
difficulty in  answering this question in  general is  the following.  The  way  one 
makes  the agent more risk averse is  to  replace his  utility function  U(I,a)  by 
H( U(I, a)) where H is a real-valued, increasing, concave function. However, if U 
satisfies  Assumption  Al,  then  H( U)  will  generally  not.  To  get  around  this 
difficulty, we will confine our attention to the case where A is a subset of the real 
line, V(I) =  -  e-kI,  G(a) = 0, and K(a)  =  eka,  i.e., the agent's utility function 
is  U(a,I)  =  -e-k(I-a),  where k >0.  Assume  also  that  U=  -e-ka,  i.e.,  the 
agent's outside opportunity is represented by the perfectly certain income a. An 
increase in risk aversion can then be represented simply by an increase in k. 
Note  that if the agent's utility function is  -e  -  k( -a)  and  U=  -e  -  ka,  then 
CFB(a)  = a +  a, which is independent of k. Hence first best profits are indepen- 
dent of k. 
PROPOSITION  15:  Consider the incentive problem (A, U, U, g, q)  where A  is  a 
subset of the real line, U(a, I)  =  -  ek(  -a)  a U  -e  -  ka,  and k > 0. Assume A3. 
Write the loss from being unable to observe the agent as L(k).  Then limkOL(k) 
O, limkooL(k)  = L*. 
PROOF:  To show that limkooL(k)  =  L*, it suffices to show that limkOoC(a*, 
k) =  x  for all a* with CFB(a*)  >  minaEA  CFB(a).  Suppose not for some such a*, 
and let CFB(a) <  CFB(a*).  Then if (II,  . ..  , In) implements  a*, we must have 
-(E  (a*)e  -  kI)eka*  >  (  E?  (a)e-kI)eka 
(II  ...  ,  In of course depend on k).  Therefore, 
(5.2)  ek(a*-a)  <3gi(a)e-kI  ,3T(a*)ek- 
i  i 
Now  let k -  x.  The LHS of  (5.2) -  x.  Therefore so must the RHS.  We may 
assume w.l.o.g., however, that I,  = miniIi. Then 
is  i  (a)e  kth  denomi  (a)e  k(C  t  io,) 
Zjigi(a*)e-  kl  E  i7i(a*)e  k(I  I-I,)' 
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We show now that limk,OL(k) = 0. Let Ii =  qi-  F. Then the agent maximizes 
(5.3)  E(-ek(  a))=-E(1-k(I-a)+  k  (I-  a)2+  ) 
I-  + k( Y.  qri(a)qi -F  - a)  k2-  E(I -a)2  +*-- 
It follows that the agent maximizes 
(Z,gj(a)q  - F -a)  -  E(I -a  ... 
which  means  that in  the  limit k -*0  the  agent  maximizes B(a)  -  CFB(a),  i.e. 
chooses  a first-best action.  Furthermore, setting (5.3) equal to  -e-k=  1 + 
ka +  *  , we see that in the limit k -  0, 
max  (Z3ri(a)qi-a)-F=a, 
so  that  the  principal's  expected  profit  equals  F =  maxaEA  (A,i  qi  -a)  -  a 
=  maxa  E A (B (a)  -  CFB  (a))  =  first-best  profit.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 15 tells us about the behavior of L(k)  for extreme values of k. It 
would be interesting to know whether L(k)  is increasing in k. We do not know 
the answer to that question except for the case n = 2, A finite. 
PROPOSITION 16: Make  the same hypotheses as  in Proposition 14. Assume in 
addition that n = 2 and A is finite.  Then L(k)  is increasing in k. 
PROOF: See Appendix. 
REMARK 9:  Propositions 15 and  16 tell us how  the principal's welfare varies 
with k. It is also interesting to ask how the shape of the optimal incentive scheme 
depends on k. Unfortunately, even in the case n = 2, very little can be said. In 
this case, the incentive scheme is characterized by the agent's share s.  It is not 
difficult  to  construct  examples  showing  that  an  increase  in  the  agent's  risk 
aversion may increase the optimal value of s, or may decrease it. 
We  conclude  this  section  by  considering  how  L  depends  on  the  agent's 
incremental  costs.  Consider  the  case  of  additive  separability,  i.e.,  K(a) 
constant.  Suppose  that  we  write  the  agent's  utility  function  as  Uj(a, I) 
=  Gj(a)  +  V(I),  where Gj(a)  =  a  +  XF(a),  X > 0. (Without loss of generality, we 
take K =  1.) Then, when X is small, one feels that L will be small since the agent 
does not require much of a reward to work hard. The fact that limx,OL(X) = 0 
has  in  fact  been  established  by  Shavell [20]. We  prove  a  somewhat  stronger 
result. 
PROPOSITION 17:  Consider  the  incentive problem  (A,  U,,  U, g, q),  where  U,(a,  I) 
=  a  +  XF(a)  +  V(I)  for  all  a e  A,  X > 0.  Assume  that  A1-A3  hold for  this 40  S. J. GROSSMAN  AND  0.  D.  HART 
problem. Assume also that (1) A is an interval of the real line; (2) B(a)  and F(a) 
are twice differentiable  in the interior of A;  (3)  V is twice differentiable  on 4 and 
V' > 0; (4) There is a unique maximizer a* of B(a)  lying in the interior of A and 
B"(a*)  < 0. Then limX>0(L(X)/X)  = 0. 
PROOF: Consider the incentive problem with X =  1. Then  there are a's arbi- 
trarily close to a* for which C(a)  is finite. For let the principal set vi =  rq,  -  k 
where  k  is  chosen  so  that  vi E Qt for  all  i.  Then  the  agent  will  maximize 
Zri  (a) U(a,  I),  i.e.  T(a)q,  +  F(a)/r.  By letting r  -  x,  we can get the agent to 
choose an action arbitrarily close to a*. For such an action, C(a)  will be finite. 
Consider  now  an  a  arbitrarily  close  to  a*.  Let  (v,,  . . . , v")  be  the  cost 
minimizing way of implementing a when X =  1. Then it is clear from (2.2) that 
(Xv, +  1B,  . ..  , Xvn +  3)  will  implement  a  for  A #  1, where 
X(ZTj(a)vj  +  F(a))  +  ae  + /3=U. 
It follows that 
L(X)  a  - 
1  h( )qa-h  (U-  a-XF(a)) 
-  (E  7r(a)qj  -  E7T(a)h(Xvi  +  13)), 
where a  maximizes E  i(a)qi  -  h(U  -  a -  XF(a)), i.e. a is the first-best action in 
problem X. 
Therefore, 
X  <  [ A(  Xi(a*) qj-h  (U-a-XF(a*)) 
-  (E'ui(a)q, 
-  '7T,(a)h(Xvj  +  /e)) 
[  {  ar()q,  -  h(U-a  -XF(a)) 
-  Ev7i(a*)qi +  h(U-a  -  XF(a*)) } 
Now  a-  a* as X-->  0. Furthermore, by differentiating the first-order conditions 
(dl  a)(2Mri(a)  -  h(U-a  -  XF())  =,  one  can  show  that  dl/dX  exists  at 
X = 0. It follows from the mean-value theorem and the fact that B'(a*)  =  0 that 
the second square bracket  ->  as X  -0.  To see that the first square bracket -  0, 
note that, since a is arbitrary, we can make a converge to a* as fast as we like. 
Therefore we need only show that 
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But 
r7T(a)[h(vi  +  hv  )  )-h(U-a  -XF(a*))] 
-  37Xi(a)[ h  (Xv  +  U-a  -  -  X(a)v.-F(a)) 
- h ( U-at-  XF(a*))| 
-  2 7T1(a)[ h (U-a)  +  h'(U-a))(Xv  -X 3 i(a)v,  -XF(a)) 
+  h..  -h(U-a)  + h'(U-a)(XF(a*))  + 
-  h'( U + a)(-  XF(a) + XF(a*))  +  * 
from which (5.4) follows.  Q.E.D. 
The proof of Proposition 17 is based on an envelope argument. It appears that 
a  similar result can  be  established for  the more general case  where  U  is  not 
additively separable, but Assumption Al  holds. Since the proof is more compli- 
cated, however, we will not pursue this result here. The assumption that a* lies in 
the interior of A may seem quite strong. Note, however, that if a* is a boundary 
point and B'(a*)  #, 0, then the second-best optimal action equals a*  for small 
enough X. It is straightforward to apply the proof of Proposition 17 to show that 
limx,0(L(X)/X)  = 0 in this case too. 
Since  the  marginal product  of  labor  of  the  agent-that  is,  the  increase  in 
expected profit resulting from an extra pound of  expenditure by  the agent-is 
proportional to 1  /X, Proposition 17 can be interpreted as saying that the welfare 
loss  L  is  of  a  smaller order of  magnitude  than  the  reciprocal of  the  agent's 
marginal product of labor. 
6.  EXTENSIONS 
We have assumed throughout the paper that the principal is risk-neutral and 
that the agent's attitudes to risk over income lotteries are independent of action 
-Assumption  Al.  We  now  briefly  consider  what  happens  if  we  relax  these 
assumptions. 
As we have noted in Section 2, Remark 3, our method of analysis generalizes 
without  any  difficulty  to  the  case  where the  principal is  risk-averse. Specific 
results change, however, The main difference is that now, even in the first-best 
situation, the principal will not bear all the risk. One implication of this is that 
even  if  there is no  disutility of  action  for the agent, i.e. a  does  not  enter the 
agent's utility function, the first-best will not generally be reached. The reason is 
that there may be a conflict between the principal and agent over what income 
lottery should be selected (for a study of this conflict, see Ross [17] and Wilson 
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As a result of this, Proposition 3, part (5), is no longer true when the principal 
is risk-averse. Nor  is Proposition  17 since L(0)  ,  0.  Propositions  1 and 2  and 
Proposition 3, parts 1-4,  continue to hold, however. So do Propositions 4 and 5 
on the characterization of an optimal incentive scheme. Propositions 7, 8 general- 
ize, as do  Propositions  10, 11, and  12 (note  that the function  CFB  is still well 
defined although it no longer refers to first-best cost). Proposition 3(6) does not 
hold  and  neither does  Proposition 6  nor Proposition 9  (at least in  its present 
form).  Finally  Corollary  1 of  Proposition  13 and  Propositions  14-16  do  not 
generalize in an obvious way, since changing the risk aversion of the agent or the 
probability distribution of outcomes affects the first-best as well as the second- 
best. 
The computational procedure presented in Section 4 for the two outcome case 
can be extended to the case where the principal is risk-averse. In the finite action 
case, it is still true that the agent will be indifferent between two actions at the 
optimum,  except  in  the  case  where the  first-best can  be  achieved.  Thus  it  is 
necessary to check whether the first-best can be achieved. Otherwise the proce- 
dure is unaltered. 
We turn now to the consequences of relaxing Assumption Al.  These are much 
more serious since most of our analysis has depended crucially on being able to 
choose the control variables V(Ij),  . . . , V(I,)  independently of a.  Some results 
do generalize, however. In particular one can show that Propositions 1, 3, 10, and 
12 generalize. It seems unlikely that the characterization of an optimal incentive 
scheme in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, part 1, holds, but we do not have a 
counterexample. Surprisingly, perhaps, Proposition 5, part 2 does hold. Proposi- 
tion 6 does not hold and it seems unlikely that Propositions 7-9  do. 
In the two outcome case, one can still show that it is optimal for the agent's 
share s to satisfy 0 <  s <  1. As a consequence Propositions 10 and 12 generalize. 
Proposition  11 does  not  generalize, however, and nor does  our computational 
procedure for the two outcome case. Propositions 13 and  14 and Corollary 1 of 
Proposition 14 do not hold as they stand, although they do if one enlarges the set 
of feasible incentive schemes to include random schemes. (As we have noted in 
footnote  17, once Assumption Al  is dropped, random incentive schemes may be 
superior to  deterministic schemes.) Finally,  it seems likely  that Proposition  17 
could be generalized to the nonseparable case. 
7.  SUMMARY 
The  purpose of  this paper has  been  to develop  a method  for analyzing the 
principal-agent problem in the case where the agent's attitudes to income risk are 
independent  of  action.  Our  method  consists  of  breaking  up  the  principal's 
problem into a computation of the costs and benefits accruing to the principal 
when the agent takes a particular action. We have used this method to establish a 
number of results about the structure of the optimal incentive scheme and about 
the determinants of  the welfare loss  resulting from the principal's inability  to 
observe  the  agent's  action.  We  have  shown  that  it  is  never  optimal  for  the PRINCIPAL-AGENT  PROBLEM  43 
incentive scheme to be such that the principal's and agent's payoff are negatively 
related  over  the  whole  outcome  range,  although  such  a  relationship may  be 
optimal  over  part of  the  range. We  have  found  sufficient  conditions  for  the 
incentive scheme to be monotonic, progressive, and regressive. We have shown 
that  a  decrease  in  the  quality  of  the  principal's information  in  the  sense  of 
Blackwell increases welfare loss. When there are only two outcomes, welfare loss 
also  increases  when  the  agent  becomes  more  risk  averse.  Finally,  we  have 
discussed how our techniques can be used to compute optimal incentive schemes 
in particular cases. 
While  we  have  talked  throughout about  "the" principal-agent problem,  we 
have in fact been considering the simplest of a number of such problems. More 
complicated principal-agent problems arise when not only is the principal unable 
to monitor the agent, but also the agent possesses information about his environ- 
ment, i.e. about A,  gr,  or  U(a, I),  which the principal does not.  Such problems 
possess a number of features of the preference revelation problems studied in the 
recent incentive compatibility literature; see, for example, the Review of Economic 
Studies Symposium [16]. A start has been made in the analysis of such problems 
by Harris and Raviv [6], Holmstrom [7], and Mirrlees [12]. It will be interesting 
to see whether the techniques presented here will also be useful in the solution of 
these more complicated principal-agent problems. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF  OF  PROPOSITION  16:  It suffices to show  that C(a, k) is increasing locally  in  k for each 
a E A whenever C(a, k) is finite. Let k = Xk A  >  1. Assume that (II,  I2) iS the cost minimizing way of 
implementing a, given k. Then, by the results of Section 4, e.g. equation (4.4), 
1TIWI  +  7T2W2  = 
ek(Qa  +a) 
(A1) 
ST'IWI  +  7T2W2  =  et? 
where 
w, 
=  e-k)1,  w2 =ek12,  I  = 
7TI(a),  7T2  =  7T2(a),  7iT  =  VTI(a'),  7T 
=  VT2(a)  a' E  A,  a' <  a.  Fur- 
thermore we can pick a' so that a' is independent of k for X close to  1. 
Equations (Al)  determine w1 and w2 for each value of k. The cost of implementing a, C(a, k), is 
then given by 
(A2)  C(a, k)=  7rII  I+  7T2'2  -I  (7r1logWI +  rT2logW2). 
k 
Differentiating (A2) with respect to X we get 
aC(a,Xk)  1  1  VT  dw1  V72 dW2 
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Set x =  e  k(a+a),  y  =  e-k(a'  +a)  in (Al).  Then e-k(a+a)  =  X,  e-k  a'+a)  =y'7  Hence 
dw1  dw2 
dX  +7T2 dW2 =xlogx,  dX  dX 
(A4) 
dw  I  dw2 
dX  +72  dX =Ylogy, 
where derivatives are evaluated at X=  1. Solving (Al),  (A4) yields 
7X  -  7T2Y  7T2X -7T2Y 
7172-  7172  7T2  -72 
dw1 _  X  logx-7T2Y  log y 
dX  7g2-7T2 
It follows that logw1 >  (l/w1)(dwI/dA).  For 
dw1  7T2X-7T2  y  7T2'X-  7T2  y  /  7T'X log x-  7T2 y  10g  y 
(A5)  w1log,w1-  d  ,  log2,  -  dX  T-7T2  7T - 7T2  7T - 7T2 
7T2-7T2  [(ax -  y)log  ax  -ax  logx  -y  log y] 
where a  =  72,  ,  =  7T2. However, the RHS of (A5)  >  0 by Lemma 3 below. The same argument shows 
that logw2 >  (l/w2)(dw2/dA).  It follows from (A3) that (aC/lX)  > 0, i.e., C is increasing locally in k. 
LEMMA  3:  Assume  a,  3, x, y  > 0.  Then if  a >  8  and  ax >  /y,  ax log x-/3y  log <  (ax-/3y) 
log((ax  -  /y)/(a  -  /)).  On the other hand, if a <  8 and ax < fy,  ax log x -  fy  log y  >  (ax  -  fy) 
log((ax  -  fy)/(a  -  /)). 
PROOF:  Since z logz  is a convex function, 
(y  logy)  +  (a  /)( 
-  y log 
a  - 
)  >  x logx. 
This proves the first part. The second part follows similarly.  Q.E.D. 
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